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INTERPRETING THE 1997 AMENDMENT TO THE
IDEA: DID CONGRESS INTEND TO LIMIT THE
REMEDY OF PRIVATE SCHOOL TUITION
REIMBURSEMENT FOR DISABLED CHILDREN?
Emily S. Rosenblum*
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires school
districts to fund private school placements for disabled children who cannot
be educated appropriately in public school. This Note explores the conflict
over whether private school tuition reimbursement should be available
under the IDEA to parents who place their disabled children in private
school without previously receiving special education from a public agency.
The conflict hinges on whether a 1997 amendment to the IDEA foreclosed
the equitable considerations previously utilized by the courts to determine
whether tuition reimbursement was appropriate and limited the remedy to
cases where the child previously received public special education services.
This Note argues that the 1997 amendment to the IDEA did not limit the
remedy of tuition reimbursement. It suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court
uphold the remedy of tuition reimbursement when appropriate, whether or
not the disabled child previously received public special education services,
when it decides the issue later this Term.
INTRODUCTION
"'Weak minded,"'1 "difficult to educate," 2 and "moron of a very low
type... who is incapable of absorbing knowledge" 3 are just a few of the
justifications given by states attempting to exclude disabled children from
public schools in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 4 Prior to
1975, there were no federal laws requiring states to provide disabled
students with special education services. 5 Although a minority of states
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Aaron Saiger for his guidance and insight throughout this process. Special thanks to my
friends and family, especially my mom and dad, my grandma, and Katie for their
unconditional love and support, and to Josh for his patience and encouragement.
1. CHARLES J. Russo & ALLAN G. OSBORNE, JR., ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS & SCHOOL-
BASED CASES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 4 (2008) (quoting Watson v. City of Cambridge,
32 N.E. 864 (D. Mass. 1893)).
2. Id.
3. Bd. of Educ. v. State ex rel. Goldman, 191 N.E. 914, 916 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934).
4. See Russo & OSBORNE, supra note 1, at 4-5.
5. Id. at 4.
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independently enacted legislation requiring public schools to educate
disabled children, 6 more often, public schools excluded disabled children
completely. 7 As a result, public schools across the country did not satisfy
the "educational needs of millions of children with disabilities."'8 Many of
these children grew up without programs and services that could have
helped them manage their disabilities and lead productive, independent
lives.9
Significant progress has been made since the federal government
intervened and passed legislation to protect the educational rights of
children with disabilities in 1975.10 This legislation, now known as the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), has given many
disabled children access to public education and led to sweeping reforms in
special education policy."I
In order to receive federal funding for special education programs under
the IDEA, public schools are required to provide all disabled children with
a "free appropriate public education" (FAPE). 12  The IDEA outlines
elaborate procedures for identifying, evaluating, and determining
appropriate placements for disabled children.13 When a school district does
not have the resources or capabilities to adequately educate a disabled child
in a public school, the district must propose and fund an appropriate private
school placement for the child. 14
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2006); see also Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 868
(D.D.C. 1972) ("The problem of providing special education for 'exceptional' children
(mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed, physically handicapped, hyperactive and other
children with behavioral problems) is one of major proportions in the District of
Columbia."). Even when they were not "excluded entirely" from the public school system,
disabled children were often left undiagnosed and denied appropriate services prior to 1975.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2); see also Terry Jean Seligmann, An Idea Schools Can Use: Lessons
from Special Education Legislation, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 759, 759 n.2 (2001) (noting that
Congress found that over one million disabled children were entirely excluded from public
school, "and that many others had failed in school because their disabilities had never been
recognized and appropriately addressed").
9. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) ("Improving educational results for children with
disabilities is an essential element of our national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity,
full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with
disabilities.").
10. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat.
773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482).
11. See Alan Gartner & Dorothy Kerzner Lipsky, Beyond Special Education: Toward a
Quality System for All Students, 57 HARV. Enuc. REV. 367, 371 (1987) (finding that over
650,000 more disabled children received services in 1985-1986 than in 1974-1975);
Seligmann, supra note 8, at 759-60 (stating that over six million children received special
education services as of 2001).
12. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
13. See id. § 1414.
14. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(B). Currently, "almost seven million students nationwide receive
special-education services." Joseph Berger, Private Schooling for the Disabled, and the
Fight over Who Pays, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2007, at B7. Seventy-one thousand special
education students are "educated in private schools at public expense." Id
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The IDEA also sets forth a detailed set of procedures for cases where a
school district and the parents of a disabled child disagree over whether the
public school can offer the child an appropriate educational placement. 15 If
the school district proposes a public school placement for a disabled child,
but the parents of the child think private school is necessary, the parents can
request a due process hearing and eventually appeal to the courts to
determine the appropriate placement for their child. 16 This process can
often take several months or years 17 and parents sometimes opt to
unilaterally place their children in private school-which they believe is the
appropriate placement-during the pendency of the administrative hearings
or judicial review.18
Prior to 1997, parents who unilaterally placed their disabled children in
private school were reimbursed by the school district if the court held that
private school was, in fact, the proper placement for the child. This remedy
of reimbursement was based on a provision in the IDEA authorizing courts
to grant "appropriate" relief.19 In 1997, Congress amended the IDEA and
added a specific section on tuition reimbursement for students unilaterally
placed in private school.20
This Note analyzes the language of the 1997 amendment to the IDEA
and addresses whether Congress intended to limit the remedy of tuition
reimbursement for parents who unilaterally place their disabled children in
private school. Specifically, it discusses whether the remedy of private
school tuition reimbursement should be available to a disabled child who
never previously received public school special education services.
Part I of this Note provides background information on the history and
purpose of the IDEA and discusses the remedies authorized by the statute
and the U.S. Supreme Court when a school district does not provide a
disabled child with a FAPE. It also examines the legislative history and the
administrative agency interpretation of the statute. Part II presents and
analyzes the conflicting case law regarding tuition reimbursement after the
1997 amendment to the IDEA. After reviewing the divergent views of the
courts on this issue, Part III suggests that, because the plain text of the
provision of the IDEA is ambiguous, courts should defer to the
15. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415.
16. Id. § 1415(f).
17. See Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 361-67 (1985)
(discussing the parents' decision to place their child in private school during negotiations
and proceedings with the school district spanning eight years); Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459
F.3d 356, 360-63 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 436 (2007) (describing proceedings
lasting from 2000 until the court's decision in 2006).
18. Requests for tuition reimbursement by parents who have unilaterally placed their
children in private school have increased in recent years. In New York, reimbursement
claims have increased from 1519 in 2002 to 3675 in 2006; the cost of reimbursement
payments for the 2006-2007 school year totaled $57 million. David Stout & Jennifer
Medina, With Justices Split, City Must Pay Disabled Student's Tuition, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,
2007, at B 1.
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).
20. See id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).
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administrative agency's interpretation of the statute. This interpretation-
that the post-1997 IDEA does not create a categorical bar to tuition
reimbursement for students who have not previously received special
education or related services from a public agency-most accurately fulfills
the express purpose and underlying policy considerations of the IDEA.
Finally, given the widespread implications and current lack of guidance on
the availability of private school tuition reimbursement for unilateral parent
placement, Part III proposes that the Supreme Court adopt this
interpretation when it addresses the issue later this Tenn.
I. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT AND THE
REMEDY OF PRIVATE SCHOOL TUITION REIMBURSEMENT
Part I of this Note introduces the IDEA, the statute that protects the
educational rights of disabled children in the United States. Part L.A briefly
discusses the rights, or lack thereof, of disabled children before the
enactment of the IDEA and how parents and advocates used the civil rights
movement to spark the effort to secure equal educational rights for children
with disabilities. It then takes a detailed look at the purposes and
requirements of the statute. Part I.B examines the remedies authorized by
the IDEA when a school fails to provide a disabled child with an
appropriate education, including private school tuition reimbursement. This
part discusses School Committee of Burlington v. Department of
Education,21 a 1985 Supreme Court case that authorized retroactive private
school tuition reimbursement for disabled children who could not be
appropriately educated in public school. 22  It also discusses the 1997
revision to the IDEA, which specifically comments on the issue of private
school tuition reimbursement. Finally, Part I.C briefly introduces the
methods of statutory interpretation that courts have used to interpret the
IDEA. It then examines the legislative history of the IDEA and the
interpretation of the Department of Education (DOE), the administrative
agency that manages federal education policy.
A. An Introduction to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
In 1975, Congress passed legislation to protect the rights of disabled
children and prevent the states from excluding these children from public
schools.23 This legislation, originally known as the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, was amended in 1990 and renamed the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 24 The 1990 revision made the
IDEA permanent legislation rather than temporary legislation that would
21. 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
22. Id. at 369
23. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat.
773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482).
24. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 104-476, 104 Stat. 1103,
1141-42 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482).
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expire unless reauthorized. 25 Since it was originally enacted, the IDEA has
been amended several times,26 most recently in 2004.27 This Note focuses
primarily on a provision that was added to the IDEA in 1997, although the
implications of the 2004 revisions on private school tuition reimbursement
will be discussed briefly in Part 111.28
1. Moving Toward Equality: Judicial and Legislative Recognition that
Disabled Children Deserve Equal Access to Public Education
This section introduces the movement to gain educational rights for
disabled children. It discusses how advocates for disabled children used the
civil rights movement to advance their cause by bringing lawsuits and
lobbying for federal legislation to protect the educational rights of disabled
children. Before the passage of the IDEA, disabled children were regularly
left undiagnosed and denied access to public schools and the special
education services they needed.29 Until the early 1970s, these practices
were often approved and sanctioned by state courts. 30
The civil rights movement-most significantly, the Supreme Court's
landmark decision striking down racial segregation in public schools in
Brown v. Board of Education3 1-unwittingly "laid the foundation" for
efforts to secure educational rights for the disabled. 32 In the late 1960s and
early 1970s, parents and activists brought a plethora of cases seeking
25. Russo & OSBORNE, supra note 1, at 13.
26. Id. Charles Russo and Allen Osborne note several significant amendments to the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), such as the addition of a clause in 1986
that allowed parents to recover legal expenses for victories in litigation against school
boards, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(3)), and the abrogation of Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity in 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1106 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1403).
27. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118
Stat. 2647 (2004) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) (amending the IDEA).
Although the 2004 revision officially renamed the legislation again, this Note will refer to it
as the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a) ("This chapter may be cited as the 'Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act."').
28. See infra note 324 and accompanying text.
29. Russo & OSBORNE, supra note 1, at 4.
30. Id. at 4-5; see also, e.g., Watson v. City of Cambridge, 32 N.E. 864, 864 (Mass.
1893) (finding the "good faith" decision of a school to exclude a child it considered "so
weak in mind as not to derive any marked benefit from instruction" was final and not subject
to revision by the court); Bd. of Educ. v. State ex rel. Goldman, 191 N.E. 914, 916 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1934) ("As a matter of common sense it is apparent that.., an idiot or imbecile who is
incapable of absorbing knowledge or making progress in the schools, ought to be
excluded."); State ex rel. Beattie v. Bd. of Educ., 172 N.W. 153, 155 (Wis. 1919) (holding
that the school board's decision to remove a paralyzed child from public school should not
be interfered with because the school board did not act illegally or unreasonably and was
considering the best interest of the school and the general welfare).
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. See Russo & OSBORNE, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that Chief Justice Earl Warren
"characterized education as the most important function of government" and explained that
educational opportunity, "'where the State has undertaken to provide it, is a right that must
be made available to all on equal terms"' (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493)).
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educational equality for the poor and minorities, thus driving forward the
movement for equal rights for disabled students. 33 These cases-albeit not
as groundbreaking as Brown-had important implications for students with
disabilities. 34  Advocates for the disabled used these civil rights cases
addressing educational equality for minority and impoverished students to
advance their cause. 35 They brought suits and lobbied Congress to pass
federal laws requiring equal treatment for disabled students, arguing that the
"legal principles" behind the civil rights cases applied "regardless of why a
particular group of students may be classified as a minority. '36 The initial
success of these advocates was limited to small victories in the district
courts. 3 7 These victories were "considered landmark opinions despite their
limited precedential value" because they "provided the impetus for
Congress to pass [the] sweeping legislation mandating" that students with
disabilities have access to an appropriate public education. 38 The next
section describes this legislation.
2. Congressional Efforts to Protect Disabled Children: A Look at the
Goals and Requirements of the IDEA
The purposes of the IDEA, the statute enacted to protect the educational
rights of disabled children, are stated in 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) and include
ensuring that all disabled children have access to a "free appropriate public
education that emphasizes special education and related services designed
to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education,
employment, and independent living." 39 This section takes a detailed look
at the framework and specific requirements of the IDEA.
33. Id. at 6-7; see also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974) (finding that a public
school's failure to provide English language instruction to students of Chinese ancestry who
did not speak English violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it denied them the
meaningful opportunity to participate in public education), abrogated by Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C.
1967) (holding that the curriculum-tracking system used by the city's public schools was
discriminatory toward poor and minority students because the system denied children who
were in the lower curriculum tracks educational opportunities).
34. See Russo & OSBORNE, supra note 1, at 8 (noting that, although these cases were not
binding precedent in disputes over educational equality for disabled students, they are
persuasive authority and the legal principles remain compelling).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Panitch v. Wisconsin, 444 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Hairston v.
Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. W. Va. 1976); Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D.
Pa. 1975); Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pa. Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
38. Russo & OSBORNE, supra note 1, at 8.
39. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006). The other stated purposes of the IDEA include
(1) protecting the rights of disabled children and their parents; (2) assisting public agencies
in providing education for all disabled children; (3) assisting the states with "early
intervention services for infants and toddlers with disabilities and their families"; (4)
"ensur[ing] that educators and parents have the necessary tools to improve educational
results for [disabled] children"; and (5) assessing the efforts to serve disabled children and
ensuring that such efforts are effective. Id. § 1400(d)(1)(B)-(C).
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In order to be covered by the IDEA, a child's educational performance
must be adversely affected by a disability, as it is defined in the IDEA.
40
As of 2004, approximately one in ten public school students receive some
special education services.
4 1
The IDEA process starts when either a parent or the school district
requests that a child be evaluated for a disability. 42 If it is determined that
the child has a disability, 43 the IDEA mandates the development of an
Individualized Education Program (IEP),44 a "written statement which
serves as a road map for the disabled child's education." 4 5  An IEP is
supposed to be produced by a team of parents, educators, and administrators
working cooperatively to develop a "comprehensive statement of the
educational needs of [the disabled] child."'4 6 Congress tried to ensure the
"full participation of the parents" in these IEP meetings-and the IDEA
process as a whole-by "incorporat[ing] an elaborate set of what it labeled
'procedural safeguards' into the statute.47 The IDEA gives parents the
right to "examine all records relating to such child and to participate in
meetings with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational
placement of the child . . . and to obtain an independent educational
evaluation of the child."'4 8
40. See id. § 1401(3). There are fourteen specific terms that guide who is eligible for a
"free appropriate public education" (FAPE). To be categorized as disabled for the purposes
of the IDEA, a child must be classified within one of the following categories: (1) autism;
(2) deaf-blindness; (3) deafness; (4) developmental delay; (5) emotional disturbance; (6)
hearing impairment; (7) mental retardation; (8) multiple disabilities; (9) orthopedic
impairment; (10) other health impairments; (11) specific learning disability; (12) speech or
language impairment; (13) traumatic brain injury; or (14) visual impairment including
blindness. National Dissemination Center for Children with Disabilities,
http://www.nichcy.org/Disabilities/Categories/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 10,
2009).
41. Seligmann, supra note 8, at 765. "[T]he number of children identified as having
disabilities and served under the IDEA has increased from 3.7 million in 1976-77 [(the year
after it was enacted)] to 6.1 million in 1999-2000." Id.
42. Id. at 762. Although an evaluation can be requested by the parent or the school, the
parent must consent to the evaluation. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C).
43. To determine whether a child has a disability, the school district must "use a variety
of assessment tools and strategies to gather relevant functional, developmental, and
academic information, including information provided by the parent." 20 U.S.C. §
1414(b)(2)(A). These assessment measures must be "valid and reliable" and "administered
by trained and knowledgeable personnel." Id. § 1414(b)(3)(A)(iii)-(iv).
44. Id. § 1414(d).
45. Theresa M. Willard, Note, Economics and the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act: The Influence of Funding Formulas on the Identification and Placement of
Disabled Students, 31 IND. L. REv. 1167, 1170 (1998).
46. Sch, Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985).
Specifically, the Individualized Education Program (IEP) must include the child's disability,
the short- and long-term goals of the education plan, the strategies for educating the child,
the services proposed, and the place and amount of the services to be provided. See 20
U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i) (describing the requirements of an IEP); Willard, supra note 45, at
1170.
47. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 368.
48. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1).
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Ultimately, to comply with the IDEA, the JEP must outline a plan that
includes a FAPE for the disabled child in the least restrictive environment
(LRE).49 To qualify as a FAPE, the services offered must meet certain state
and federal standards and must be tailored to the individual needs of each
child.50 The IDEA defines a FAPE as special education and related
services that
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State
educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary
school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are
provided in conformity with the individualized education program
required under section 1414(d) of [the IDEA]. 51
The IDEA's mandate that school districts provide disabled children with an
appropriate education is "not limitless" and contemplates services needed
for the child to "progress adequately." 52 The statute does not require a
placement that "would maximize the child's achievement. '53 Although the
proposed placement need not be perfect to qualify as a FAPE, it must be
"reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational
benefits." 54
To meet the IDEA requirement that a disabled child must be educated in
the LRE, "[t]o the maximum extent appropriate, children with
disabilities ... [should be] educated with children who are not disabled. '55
Children with disabilities should only be removed from the regular
education environment when "the nature or severity of the disability of a
child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary
49. Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Is a Parent Who Places a Child with a Disability in a Private
School Entitled to Tuition Reimbursement if the Child Has Never Attended a Public School?
Board of Education of the City of New York v. Tom F., 219 EDUC. L. REP. 887, 887 (2007).
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).
51. Id.
52. Seligmann, supra note 8, at 763.
53. Id.
54. Bd. ofEduc. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982).
55. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). The goal of inclusion--educating the majority of
disabled children in regular education classrooms-is seen by some as "a moral imperative
designed to avoid the segregation of children with disabilities into a separate but unequal
system." Seligmann, supra note 8, at 776 (citing Jack Pearpoint, Reflections on a Quality
Education for All Students, in EDUCATING ALL STUDENTS IN THE MAINSTREAM OF REGULAR
EDUCATION 249, 249 (Susan Stainback et al. eds., 1989)). Proponents of inclusion argue that
it will "improve education for all children" and allow special education teachers, who have
additional training and expertise, to serve both regular and special education students. Id.
Opponents of inclusion assert that disabled children were included in regular education
classes before the IDEA was passed and they were often neglected and failed to progress
academically. Id. at 777. Further, they point out, no matter what reforms are made, regular
education will always be inappropriate for some children because of the serious nature of
their disabilities. Id. Although the debate over inclusion is still very much alive, the IDEA
has "incorporated the central premise of a preference for integration by requiring that
children be educated in the least restrictive environment where their educational needs can
be appropriately met." Id. at 778.
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aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. '' 56 While the IDEA
expresses a preference for educating disabled children in public schools, it
allows for placement in private school if the child's needs cannot otherwise
be met. 57
In order to accomplish its goal of providing special education services to
all disabled children, 58 the IDEA also contains a provision known as "Child
Find."'59  To fulfill their Child Find obligations, states must develop
programs to seek out disabled children and determine if they are receiving
appropriate services. 60 The provision states,
All children with disabilities residing in the State, including children
with disabilities who are ... attending private schools, regardless of the
severity of their disabilities, and who are in need of special education and
related services, are identified, located, and evaluated and a practical
method is developed and implemented to determine which children with
disabilities are currently receiving needed special education and related
services.61
In 2004, the Child Find requirements in the IDEA were expanded. 62 Public
school officials must (1) identify children in the districts where they attend
school (as opposed to where they live) and (2) "record and report to state
education agencies the number of children from private schools who are
evaluated, determined to have disabilities, and served."'63
The IDEA sets forth both policy goals and procedural steps for school
districts to ensure access to a FAPE for disabled children. However, the
IDEA sets out more than these policies and procedures; it lays out a detailed
framework for federal and state funding to school districts to enable
compliance, which will be described in the next section.
3. The Federal Government's Commitment to Funding
Special Education Programs
Besides the goals, requirements, and procedures described in the previous
section, the IDEA is "a funding statute that provides federal funds to states
that comply with its conditions." 64  Although the federal government is
authorized to fund up to 40% of states' special education costs per year,
65
56. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
57. Seligmann, supra note 8, at 764.
58. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A).
60. Id.; see also IDEA Child Find Project, http://www.childfindidea.org (last visited
Mar. 10, 2009) (detailing the requirements of Child Find).
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A).
62. Russo& OSBORNE, supra note 1, at 13-14.
63. Id. at 14.
64. Seligmann, supra note 8, at 762. States must meet specific requirements, such as
providing a FAPE to children with disabilities, to receive federal funding under the IDEA.
Id. at 762 n. 17.
65. See id. at 783-84 (explaining the funding formula to determine the amount of money
the federal government can provide to a particular state).
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recent data shows that that it usually contributes far less. 66 Federal funding
of special education almost doubled between 1997 and 2000, from $2.6
million to $4.9 million; 67 however, percentages of federal funding still vary
widely from state to state. 68 The residual funding for special education
services must be provided by state and local sources.69 Some school
districts have claimed that, due to the lack of federal funding and the
increase in special education costs, they have had to reduce other general
education services to stay within their budget and fulfill their obligations
under the IDEA.70
Congress has identified increased federal funding as "an important step
to avoiding inappropriate and unfair funding conflicts between children
with and without disabilities thought to arise when public schools divert
general resources to fund special education programs. ' '71 The most recent
revision of the IDEA states that "[a] more equitable allocation of resources
is essential for the Federal Government to meet its responsibility to provide
an equal educational opportunity for all individuals. '72
66. See ANN LORDEMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUCATION ACT (IDEA): CURRENT FUNDING TRENDS 7 (2008), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32085_20080411.pdf (finding that, although federal
funding is almost five times greater than it was in 1995, the federal government currently
funds less than twenty percent of the cost of educating children with disabilities); Ashley
Oliver, Note, Should Special Education Have a Price Tag? A New Reasonableness
Standard for Cost, 83 DENY. U. L. REv. 763, 782 (2006) (noting that, in 2004, the federal
government only contributed seventeen percent of special education funding (citing
Telephone Interview by Ashley Oliver with Charman Paulmeno, Grants Fiscal Mgmt. Servs.
Unit, Colo. Dep't of Educ., in Denver, Colo. (Dec. 19, 2005))).
67. Seligmann, supra note 8, at 783 n.128 (citing 146 CONG. REC. S9259-60 (daily ed.
Sept. 26, 2000) (statement of Sen. Gordon Smith)).
68. See Thomas B. Parrish & Jay G. Chambers, Financing Special Education, 6 FUTURE
OF CHILD., Spring 1996, at 121, 122, available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/usrdoc
/vol6nolART7.pdf (finding that federal funding of special education varied from sixty-five
percent in Kentucky to three percent in Minnesota and New York in 1997-1998); Thomas B.
Parrish & Jean Wolman, Trends and New Developments in Special Education Funding:
What the States Report, in FUNDING SPECIAL EDUCATION 205, 215 (Thomas B. Parrish et al.
eds., 1999) (finding federal funding ranged from four percent to seventeen percent in a
survey of twenty-four states).
69. Willard, supra note 45, at 1179.
70. Seligmann, supra note 8, at 784.
71. Id. at 783 n.128 (citing 146 CONG. REC. S9259-60 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2000)
(statement of Sen. Smith)); see also Siobhan Gorman, Why Special Education Could Spark a
Veto, 33 NAT'L J. 2482 (reporting Republican Representative Michael Ferguson's view that
"insufficient funding for special education compromises the education of every student").
72. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(7) (2006). The IDEA also states,
While States, local educational agencies, and educational service agencies are
primarily responsible for providing an education for all children with disabilities, it
is in the national interest that the Federal Government have a supporting role in
assisting State and local efforts to educate children with disabilities in order to
improve results for such children and to ensure equal protection of the law.
Id. § 1400(c)(6); see also Seligmann, supra note 8, at 767 (stating that "full funding of
special education at the federal level would loosen the budgetary ties on many school
districts, and inure to the benefit of all students").
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4. Dispute Resolution Procedures Outlined in the IDEA: Due Process
Hearings, Administrative Appeals, and Judicial Review
Although the hope is that parents and school districts will be able to work
together to develop an appropriate education plan for each child, the
drafters of the IDEA recognized that disagreements between the parties
would inevitably occur. This section discusses the specific dispute
resolution methods Congress outlined in case "this cooperative approach
[does] not . . .produce a consensus between the school officials and the
parents" regarding an appropriate educational placement for the child.
73
Under the IDEA, if a party does not believe the proposed IEP meets the
requirements for a FAPE, he or she may initiate mediation, seek
administrative appeals, and, if unsuccessful, eventually seek judicial
review. 74
If mediation and other nonadversarial methods are unsuccessful, a party
may appeal an IEP through an impartial due process hearing, which is a
formal administrative proceeding where the parties present and refute
evidence before an impartial hearing officer (IHO).75 The IHO must not be
an employee of the public agency and must not have any personal or
professional conflict of interest with the hearing.
76
If one or both of the parties are still dissatisfied after the IHO renders a
decision, the IDEA allows "'any party aggrieved by the findings and
73. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985).
74. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)-(g); John E. Theuman, Obligation of Public Educational
Agencies, Under Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S. C.A. §§ 1400 et seq.),
to Pay Tuition Costs for Students Unilaterally Placed in Private Schools-Post-Burlington
Cases, 152 A.L.R. FED. 485 (1999). Parents and school districts are encouraged to resolve
disagreements through mediation and nonadversarial means when possible. The 1997
amendment included a requirement that states offer mediation as an alternative to an
administrative hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e). Thirty-nine states already offered mediation
before this provision was added and mediation was attempted in sixty percent of cases in
which an impartial hearing was ultimately requested. Seligmann, supra note 8, at 782 n. 124;
see, e.g., OFFICE OF VOCATIONAL & EDUC. SERVS. FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
SPECIAL EDUC. POLICY UNIT, N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP'T, IMPARTIAL HEARING PROCESS FOR
STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 1 (2001) [hereinafter IMPARTIAL HEARING PROCESS], available
at http://www.vesid.nysed.gov/specialed/publications/policy/ihprocessguide.htm (according
to the New York State Education Department, "[s]chool districts and parents should make
every effort to amicably resolve differences over educational programs for students with
disabilities"). The Department also provides detailed information regarding mediation
options. See IMPARTIAL HEARING PROCESS, supra.
75. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f); see also, e.g., IMPARTIAL HEARING PROCESS, supra note 74.
76. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(i). In addition, the impartial hearing officer (IHO) must
(1) "possess knowledge of, and the ability to understand, the provisions of [the IDEA],
Federal and State regulations pertaining to [the IDEA], and legal interpretations of [the
IDEA] by Federal and State courts;" (2) "possess the knowledge and ability to conduct
hearings in accordance with appropriate, standard legal practice"; and (3) "possess the
knowledge and ability to render and write decisions in accordance with appropriate, standard
legal practice." Id. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(ii)-(iv).
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decision' made after the due process hearing" to file further administrative
appeals and eventually appeals to state or federal court. 77
The IDEA is a far-reaching statute designed to prevent school districts
from discriminating against children because of their disabilities. The
legislation outlines broad policy goals and specific requirements to achieve
its ends. Part I.B discusses remedies available to parents of disabled
children under the IDEA and the case law interpreting the relevant statutory
remedial provisions.
B. Remedies Under the IDEA: From "Appropriate" Relief to Explicitly
Authorized Tuition Reimbursement
Part L.A introduced the IDEA and explained the procedures for
identifying, evaluating, and determining the appropriate placement for a
disabled child. It also discussed the dispute resolution procedures outlined
for cases where the parents of a disabled child feel that a placement
proposed by a school district does not qualify as a FAPE. This section
further examines the remedies authorized by the IDEA upon a
determination that a proposed placement for a disabled child does not, in
fact, qualify as a FAPE.
1. School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education:
Conferring Broad Discretion to Determine Relief
The IDEA directs a court to "grant such relief as [it] determines is
appropriate. '78 Although the statute is not more specific on the type of
relief authorized, the Supreme Court held that this provision of the IDEA
"confers broad discretion on the court" 79 to determine what is
"'appropriate.' "80 Courts have authorized several different types of relief
upon finding that a school district failed to provide a disabled student with a
FAPE. 81 Defining the boundaries of "appropriate" relief authorized by the
courts' "broad discretion" has been the source of much of the litigation and
controversy surrounding the IDEA. This section discusses Burlington, the
Supreme Court's landmark decision authorizing private school tuition
reimbursement as an "appropriate" remedy.
In Burlington, a child with "'emotional difficulties [which were]
secondary to a rather severe learning disorder"' was given an IEP that
proposed placing him in a class with six special education students in a
77. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (quoting 20
U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1)).
78. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).
79. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369.
80. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii)).
81. See Osborne, supra note 49, at 887. Most commonly, especially in cases where
parents do not unilaterally enroll their children in private schools, courts direct school
districts to take corrective action and develop a new IEP that provides the child with a
FAPE. Id. at 888.
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town public school.82 The child's father subsequently rejected the IEP and
requested an impartial due process hearing. 83 Based on their belief that the
town's proposed placement was not suited to their child's needs, the parents
decided to remove the child from the public school he was attending and
unilaterally enroll him in, and pay the tuition for, a private school that had
been state-approved for special education services. 84 In January 1980,
approximately six months after the parents unilaterally removed their child
from public school and enrolled him in private school, the IHO found that
the school's proposed public school placement was inappropriate and the
private school that the child was currently attending provided an appropriate
LRE to address the child's educational needs. 85
The IHO directed the town to pay for the child's private school tuition for
the entire year, including retroactive reimbursement for the parents' costs
during the pendency of the hearing. 86 Although the town eventually agreed
to pay for the child's prospective tuition expenses, it refused to retroactively
reimburse the tuition expenses. 87
The town claimed that the parents "waived any right they otherwise
might have to reimbursement" 88 because they did not comply with a
provision of the IDEA requiring the child to remain in his or her current
educational placement during the IDEA proceedings. 89
The IDEA was silent on the remedy of retroactive private school tuition
reimbursement at this time. However, using the "broad discretion" 90
authorized by the IDEA in directing the courts to grant relief they determine
to be "appropriate," 9 1  the Supreme Court held that "equitable
considerations [were] relevant in fashioning relief."'92 Based on principles
of equity, the Court upheld the retroactive tuition reimbursement ordered by
the IHO and foreclosed the town's claim that "a parental violation of [§
1415(j)] constitutes a waiver of reimbursement." 93
82. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 362.
83. Id.
84. Id. In Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993), the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a private school placement does not have to be state-approved to be
considered appropriate. Id. at 15.
85. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 363.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 363-64.
88. Id. at 371.
89. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2006)) The provision in question states,
Except as provided in subsection (k)(4), during the pendency of any
proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or local
educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the
then-current educational placement of the child, or, if applying for initial
admission to a public school, shall, with the consent of the parents, be placed in the
public school program until all such proceedings have been completed.
20 U.S.C. § 14150).
90. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369.
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).
92. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374.
93. Id. at 372.
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The Court noted that the provision requiring the student to remain in his
or her current educational placement did not mention "financial
responsibility, waiver, or parental right to reimbursement. ' 94 The Court
also stated that prospective relief ordering the school officials to develop a
new, appropriate IEP might be sufficient if the administrative and judicial
review process "could be completed in a matter of weeks. '95 However, the
IDEA process is "ponderous" and usually continues for at least one year
after the school year covered by the IEP.96
The Court reasoned that the principal purpose of the IDEA would be
thwarted if the statute were interpreted to foreclose the parental right of
reimbursement when the parents unilaterally transferred their child to an
appropriate placement. 97 Finding that the IDEA was "intended to give
handicapped children both an appropriate education and a free one," the
Court held that "it should not be interpreted to defeat one or the other of
those objectives." 98 Under the reading proposed by the town, the parents
would theoretically have had to choose between leaving their child in what
they believed was an inadequate placement or placing their child in a
supposedly appropriate placement and giving up their claim for
reimbursement. 99
Bolstering its finding that "Congress meant to include retroactive
reimbursement to parents as an available remedy in a proper case," 100 the
Court referenced legislative history favoring interim placement pending
resolution of IDEA appeals. 10 1  The Congressional Record reflects a
statement by Senator Robert T. Stafford, who said,
The conferees are cognizant that an impartial due process hearing may be
required to assure that the rights of the child have been completely
protected. We did feel, however, that the placement, or change of
placement should not be unnecessarily delayed while long and tedious
94. Id. Although the Court found that the IDEA did not foreclose tuition reimbursement
for parents who unilaterally place their children in a private school during administrative or
judicial proceedings, the Court did say that parents do so "at their own financial risk." Id. at
373-74. If the IHO (or the courts in any subsequent appeal) determined that the IEP
proposed by the school district was in fact appropriate, the parents would not have been able
to obtain reimbursement for the "interim period" when the child was in private school. Id. at
374. A finding that the proposed IEP did not provide a FAPE (and that the private school
placement did) is a precondition to relief in the form of tuition reimbursement when a parent
unilaterally places their child in private school. Id.; see also Russo & OSBORNE, supra note
1, at 233-34 (stating that the Supreme Court, in Burlington, affirmed the remedy of tuition
reimbursement "as long as the parents' chosen placement was determined to be the
appropriate placement for their child").
95. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370.
96. Id. School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education was issued in the
spring of 1985, over five years after the parents removed their child from the town's
proposed public school placement and eight years after discussions with the school district
over placement began. Id. at 361-62.
97. Id. at 372.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 370.
101. Id. at 371-73.
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administrative appeals were being exhausted. Thus the conference
adopted a flexible approach to try to meet the needs of both the child and
the State.10 2
The Burlington decision sanctioned the use of equitable considerations
and the availability of private school tuition reimbursement for children
unilaterally placed in private school by their parents. The 1997 amendment
to the IDEA, discussed in the next section, created significant controversy
over whether the Burlington holding still applied to children who had never
received special education in public school.
2. Private School Tuition Reimbursement in the 1997 Revision
to the IDEA
The previous section discussed how courts have granted reimbursement
to parents who unilaterally placed their children in private school prior to
1997. It explained the Supreme Court's decision in Burlington that
"equitable considerations are relevant" to determining relief under the
IDEA.10 3 This holding was based on § 1415(i)(2)(C), which authorizes
courts to "grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate."'1 4 While this
provision was not substantively changed by the 1997 revision, 105 new
provisions were added addressing the remedy of tuition reimbursement. 10 6
This section discusses those changes.
When Congress amended the IDEA in 1997, it included
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), a new provision that explicitly commented on the
issue of reimbursement for private school tuition. 10 7 This section states,
If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received
special education and related services under the authority of a public
agency, enroll the child in a private elementary school or secondary
school without the consent of or referral by the public agency, a court or a
hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the
cost of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency
had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child in
a timely manner prior to that enrollment. 108
After the 1997 revision, there was uncertainty and controversy over
whether Congress intended § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) to categorically bar private
102. Id. at 373 (quoting 121 CONG. REc. 37,412 (1975) (statement of Sen. Robert T.
Stafford)).
103. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
104. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006).
105. Prior to the 1997 revision, this provision was located at § 1415(e)(2). Compare
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 364, with 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(c)(iii).
106. See Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37, 63 (1997) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(10)(C)).
107. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C).
108. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).
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school reimbursement for students who have not received public special
education services. 109
Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(i), which immediately precedes the provision in
question, states that a school district is not required "to pay for the cost of
education ... of a child with a disability at a private school or facility if that
agency made a free appropriate public education available to the child and
the parents elected to place the child in such private school or facility."' 10
This section reaffirms the Court's statement in Burlington that parents who
unilaterally place their children in private schools do so "at their own
financial risk."11'
Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii), the section immediately following the
provision in question, provides limitations on tuition reimbursement and
allows the remedy to be "reduced or denied" in a number of instances. 112
Parents can be denied tuition reimbursement if (1) "at the most recent IEP
meeting," they fail to "inform the IEP Team that they [are] rejecting the
placement proposed by the public agency to provide a [FAPE] to their
child," or fail to inform the team of "their concerns and their intent to enroll
their child in a private school at public expense"; or (2) they do not give the
school district written notice detailing the information above.' 3 The
provision also states that tuition reimbursement can be "reduced or denied"
if parents refuse to produce their child for an evaluation by the school
district or "upon a judicial finding of unreasonableness with respect to
actions taken by the parents."' 14
These added provisions, which directly addressed the remedy of private
school tuition reimbursement in cases of unilateral placement for the first
time, created a firestorm of controversy. The statutory interpretation of the
IDEA, described in Part I.C, played a major role in the circuit split detailed
in Part II.
C. Statutory Interpretation and the IDEA
Parts L.A and I.B introduced the IDEA as a whole and examined the
provisions of the IDEA that are relevant to the controversy over private
school tuition reimbursement. This part discusses the methods used to
interpret the IDEA and delves into the legislative history of the statute and
the interpretation of the DOE, the federal administrative agency in charge of
education policy.
109. See generally Osborne, supra note 49 (describing the controversy and circuit split
over the 1997 revision to the IDEA).
110. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i).
111. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374 (1985); see also
supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's finding in Burlington that
denial of a FAPE is a precondition to awarding tuition reimbursement).
112. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii).
113. Id.
114. Id.
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Whether the 1997 revision to the IDEA barred private school tuition
reimbursement for students who have not previously received special
education or related services from a public agency depends primarily on
how § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is interpreted. Judge Richard Posner of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that, "a statute is 'a
command issued by a superior body (the legislature) to a subordinate body
(the judiciary)."'11 5 In interpreting statutes, the judiciary must "follow the
legislative command by applying the statute's language or referring to
legislative intent or purpose as discerned through legislative history or
canons of construction." 116 The "'primary responsibility' of the court in
interpreting a statute is to "'subordinate [the court's] wishes to the will of
Congress because the legislators' collective intention, however discerned,
trumps the will of the court."' 1 17
Thus, statutory interpretation is essentially a search for legislative intent.
There are several judicial approaches to statutory interpretation. 118 A court
may look at the language of the statute to discern intent of the legislature.' 19
If the language is unclear or ambiguous, a court may consider a myriad of
other factors-including general rules regarding statutory construction, 120
legislative history,121 and rules and regulations promulgated by
administrative agencies' 22-to interpret the statute.
1. Legislative History
Courts often look at legislative history to interpret an ambiguous statute.
This section explores the legislative record of the 1997 revision to the
IDEA and discusses how it has been utilized to shed light on Congress's
intent in amending the IDEA. 123  Like most methods of statutory
115. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 4 (1997).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 4-5 (quoting Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative
History in Construing States in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39
AM. U. L. REV. 277, 281 (1990)).
118. RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 37 (2002). The different approaches to interpreting a
statute are not mutually exclusive. "[A] judge must decide which approach or approaches
would be most convincing. A judge might start with one and if it fails or proves
unsatisfying, may move on to another." Id.
119. See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
121. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
123. Legislative history is often reviewed by courts to determine congressional intent
when a statute is vague or ambiguous. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote, "[u]sing legislative
history to help interpret unclear statutory language seems natural. Legislative history helps a
court understand the context and purpose of a statute." MIKVA & LANE, supra note 115, at 29
(citing Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 845, 848 (1992)). Legislative histories consist of the documents produced
throughout the legislative process and might include materials such as bills, amendments to
bills, committee hearings, transcripts of legislative debates, and committee reports (among
2749
FORDHAM LA WREVIEW
interpretation, the use of legislative history is not universally accepted.
Critics point out that legislative history and other extrinsic sources are not
law. 124 The legislature voted solely on the language actually contained in
the statute. 125  Legislative history is often produced by staff, not the
members of Congress and can be vague and arguably "not necessarily
reflective of the legislative intent." 126  In response, proponents of using
legislative history claim that statutory language is invariably vague and
ignoring extrinsic sources often hinders the process of determining the
legislature's intent. 127
Discussing the 1997 amendment to the IDEA, the Report of the House
Committee on Education and the Workforce explained that the "bill makes
a number of changes to clarify the responsibility of public school districts to
children with disabilities."'128  The House report asserts that Congress
attempted to "address the problem of over-identification of children with
disabilities" and eliminate "inappropriate financial incentives for referring
children to special education."'129 The House report also specifically
commented on § 1412, stating that,
other things). Id. at 28. The history of a particular statute depends on the legislative steps the
statute has been through and how thoroughly each step has been documented. Id.
124. See Marshall J. Breger, Introductory Remarks at the Eighteenth Annual
Administrative Law Issue Conference on Statutory Interpretation: The Role of Legislative
History in Judicial Interpretation-A Discussion Between Judge Kenneth W. Starr and
Judge Abner J. Mikva, 1987 DUKE L.J. 362, 367, 369 (stating that the "mutable nature" of
legislative history "has prompted criticism from judges, academicians and legislators alike"
and describing Judge Starr's position that a statute is "the finished product of the legislature"
and the courts should "avoid sorting through preliminary materials"); Robert H. Jackson,
Problems of Statutory Interpretation, 8 F.R.D. 121, 124 (1948) (describing reliance on
legislative history as "a badly overdone practice, of dubious help to true interpretation");
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 429-
30 & n.85 (1989) (discussing Justice Antonin Scalia's "considerable doubt" over the use of
legislative history, specifically Justice Scalia's opinion that because legislative history is not
law, "[j]udicial reliance on legislative history thus increases the power of interest groups
over the interpretive process at the expense of Congress itself').
125. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 118, at 49; Sunstein, supra note 124, at 416.
126. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 118, at 49; see also Sunstein, supra note 124, at 416
("Statutory terms are the enactment of the democratically elected legislature and represent
the relevant 'law.' Statutory terms-not legislative history, not legislative purpose, not
legislative 'intent'-have gone through the constitutionally specified procedures for the
enactment of law.").
127. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 118, at 50; see also Sunstein, supra note 124, at 430
(stating that it is "unlikely that the history will only reflect the views of self-interested
private groups" and that "legislative history provides a sense of the context and purpose of a
statutory enactment" and can "sometimes reveal what some or many members of the
Congress thought about the meaning of an ambiguous term").
128. H.R. REP. No. 105-95, at 92 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 90.
129. Id. at 88-90, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 86-87. Discussing the 1997
amendments-although not § 1412 specifically-Representative Michael Castle stated,
This law ... has had unintended and costly consequences.
For example, it has resulted in children being labeled as disabled when they
were not. It has resulted in school districts unnecessarily paying expensive private
school tuition for children. It has resulted in cases where lawyers have gamed the
system to the detriment of schools and children....
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[20 U.S.C. § 1412] ... specifies that parents may be reimbursed for the
cost of a private educational placement under certain conditions (i.e.,
when a due process hearing officer or judge determines that a public
agency had not made a [FAPE] available to the child, in a timely manner,
prior to the parents enrolling the child in that placement without the
public agency's consent). Previously, the child must have had received
special education and related services under the authority of a public
agency. 130
Senator James Jeffords, a proponent of the 1997 revision to the IDEA,
stated on the floor, "[s]hould educators have an opportunity to offer a free
appropriate public education to a child with a disability, before the child's
parents place the child in a private school and send the school district the
bill?... [The amendment] dictates that the answer be yes, but so does
common sense."
131
This legislative history has been cited to support the position that the
1997 revision to the IDEA intended to bar private school tuition
reimbursement for students unilaterally placed in private school.
132
However, opponents of this view have stated that the "most pertinent
legislative history merely restates the language of the statute and is
consequently unhelpful."1 33 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit called the House report's comment on § 1412 an "awkward
paraphrase" of the statutory language and held that the legislative history
"does not expressly exclude reimbursement where special education and
related services have not been previously provided."'
134
2. Administrative Agency Interpretation
This section takes a closer look at the DOE and the role of administrative
agencies in general. It examines the DOE's interpretation of the 1997
This bill makes it harder for parents to unilaterally place a child in elite private
schools at public taxpayer expense, lowering costs to local school districts.
143 CONG. REc. H2536 (daily ed. May 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Michael Castle).
130. H.R. REP. No. 105-95, at 93, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 90; see also Brief
for Petitioner at 34, Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F., 128 S. Ct. 1 (2007) (No. 06-637) (stating that it
is "clear beyond cavil" that the 1997 revisions to the IDEA were meant to control
government expenditures for private school tuition reimbursement).
131. 143 CONG. REC. S4295, S4296 (daily ed. May 12, 1997) (statement of Sen. James
Jeffords); see also 143 CONG. REC. H2536 (daily ed. May 13, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Castle) (stating that "[tihis bill makes it harder for parents to unilaterally place a child in elite
private schools at public taxpayer expense, lowering costs to local school districts").
132. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17-18, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T. A.,
129 S. Ct. 987 (2009) (No. 08-305) (granting certiorari); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 130,
at 34.
133. Brief for Respondent at 22, Tom F., 128 S. Ct. 1 (No. 06-637).
134. Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 373 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
436 (2007). It has also been argued that the legislative history is "misrepresent[ed] ... or
[cited] out of context" when used to support an interpretation that would limit the remedy of
tuition reimbursement because most of it does not directly relate to § 1412 or the controversy
regarding tuition reimbursement for children who have never received special education or
related services from a public agency. Brief for Respondent, supra note 133, at 24 n. 13.
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amendment to the IDEA in both an official regulation and an informal
policy letter. Congress established the DOE, a federal administrative
agency, on May 4, 1980.135 The DOE "establishes policy for . . .and
coordinates most federal assistance to education," including administering
the IDEA. 136 The purpose of the DOE is to help implement the President's
education agenda and legislation passed by Congress. 137
In general, administrative agencies play an increasingly large role in
implementing statutory schemes. 138  In many cases, an administrative
agency must interpret a statute in order to accomplish its mission. 139 Like
the judicial branch, administrative agencies must interpret statutes based on
the legislature's intent and "defer to the plain meaning" of the statute. 140
However, when the text of a statute is unclear or ambiguous, the Supreme
Court has "long recognized... the principle of deference to administrative
interpretations."'14 1 In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, the Supreme Court outlined a two-step approach to determine
whether a court should give deference to an administrative agency's
interpretation. 142  First, a court must determine whether Congress has
commented on the exact issue. 143 "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter."' 144 However, under the second step outlined in
Chevron, when the intent of Congress cannot be discerned from the plain
language of the statute, federal courts must defer to the administrative
agency's "permissible" interpretation. 145 A court "may not substitute its
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency."' 146
135. See Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 668
(1979) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3401 (2006)); U.S. Department of Education, An Overview
of the U.S. Department of Education, http://www.ed.gov/about/overview/focus/what.html
(last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
136. U.S. Department of Education, supra note 135.
137. Id. The overall mission of the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) is "to serve
America's students-to ensure that all have equal access to education and to promote
excellence in our nation's schools." Id.
138. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 115, at 46.
139. Id.; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984) ("'The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created...
program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any
gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress."' (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231
(1974))).
140. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 115, at 46.
141. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
142. Id. at 842.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 843.
146. Id. at 844. The Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council
held,
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers.., the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
2752 [Vol. 77
2009] PRIVATE SCHOOL TUITION & DISABLED CHILDREN
During the DOE's notice-and-comment rule-making period 147 following
the 1997 amendment to the IDEA, a commenter requested that the Agency
explain whether § 1412 only applied in situations where the child received
public special education and related services. In other cases (i.e., where the
child has not attended public school), the commenter stated that the DOE
should clarify that IHOs and courts "still retain broad equitable powers to
award relief."' 4 8
In response, the DOE stated in its final regulations for "Assistance to
States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and the Early
Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers With Disabilities,"
[H]earing officers and courts retain their authority, recognized in
Burlington and [Florence County School District Four v. Carter] to
award "appropriate" relief if a public agency has failed to provide FAPE,
including reimbursement and compensatory services, under [§ 1415] in
instances in which the child has not yet received special education and
related services. This authority is independent of their authority under [§
1412] to award reimbursement for private placements of children who
previously were receiving special education and related services from a
public agency.' 49
Essentially, the DOE stated in its official regulation that the 1997
amendment to the IDEA-specifically the addition of §
1412(a)(l0)(C)(ii)-did not categorically bar the remedy of private school
tuition reimbursement for children who had not received special education
or related services from a public agency. 150 Proponents of this view have
asserted that the DOE's interpretation of the 1997 amendment to the
IDEA-stated in the final official regulation-should be given deference
under Chevron.'5 1 Conversely, those who believe the 1997 revision to the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43. Regulations promulgated by the agency are given controlling weight unless
they are "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. at 844.
147. Notice-and-comment rulemaking is a process where a proposed rule is published in
the Federal Register and is open to comment by the general public for at least 30 days.
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). After the notice is given,
the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without
opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant matter
presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general
statement of their basis and purpose.
Id. § 553(c).
148. Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg.
12,601, 12,602 (Mar. 12, 1999).
149. Id. at 12,602.
150. Id.
151. Brief for Respondent, supra note 133, at 25-26 & n.15; see also United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (stating that-although the degree of deference given
to an administrative agency interpretation should vary with the circumstances-"express
congressional authorization[] to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that
produces regulations or rulings" is a "very good indicator" that Chevron deference should
apply).
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IDEA should bar reimbursement for children who never received special
education and related services from a public agency assert that the DOE's
commentary is irrelevant and not entitled to any deference because it fails
the first part of the Chevron analysis.' 52 They believe the statute is not
vague and the intent of the legislature can be discerned from the plain
language of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) of the IDEA. 153 Under Chevron, if the
plain language of the statute shows "clear congressional intent" on the
"precise question at issue," the statute must be interpreted according to the
text, and the court "must reject administrative constructions which are
contrary."154
In addition to the final official regulation-stating that the addition of §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) did not foreclose the remedy of tuition reimbursement as
a form of equitable relief authorized by § 1415(i)(2)(C) and recognized by
the Supreme Court in Burlington155-the DOE expressly commented on the
issue of private school tuition reimbursement again in response to an
inquiry by a special education advocate for parents. The letter from the
advocate asked whether parents must place their children in public school to
obtain private school tuition reimbursement as a result of the added
provision.1 56 In a response dated March 19, 1999, the DOE wrote, "[w]e do
not view [§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)] as foreclosing categorically an award of
reimbursement in a case in which a child has not yet been enrolled in
special education and related services under the authority of a public
agency."'157 The letter described tuition reimbursement as "an equitable
remedy" that can be ordered by IHOs and courts "in appropriate
circumstances." 15 8
Although this statement was in the form of an informal policy letter, the
Second Circuit has stated that "deference to a policy letter may be
appropriate where the statutory language is ambiguous."' 159 However, the
court did note that the appropriate level of deference "remains unclear."' 160
152. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
153. See Reply Brief at 12, Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F., 128 S. Ct. 1 (2007) (No. 06-637)
(stating that a court should only look to an administrative agency's interpretation if a statute
is silent or ambiguous in relevant respects). The reply brief also states that the DOE's
commentary contains "no analysis" of the relevant language, ignores "the plain language of
the statute," and is "unreasonable." Id.
154. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
155. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
156. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 133, at 27.
157. Letter from Thomas Hehir, Dir., Office of Special Educ. & Rehabilitative Servs.,
Dep't of Educ., to Susan Luger, Clinical Social Worker, Educational Consultant & Advocate
(Mar. 19, 1999); see also List of Correspondence--Office of Special Education and
Rehabilitative Services, 65 Fed. Reg. 9178 (Feb. 23, 2000) (describing the letter "regarding
the absence of any provision in Part B of IDEA that makes a child's prior receipt of special
education and related services from a public agency a prerequisite to a parent's obtaining
tuition reimbursement from a hearing officer or court for the cost of a unilateral private
school placement").
158. Letter from Thomas Hehir to Susan Luger, supra note 157.
159. Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 373 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
436 (2007); see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (stating that,
2754 [Vol. 77
2009] PRIVATE SCHOOL TUITION & DISABLED CHILDREN
The next part of this Note examines the split in the federal courts over
whether the 1997 amendment to the IDEA limited the remedy of private
school tuition reimbursement to cases where the disabled child previously
received special education or related services from a public agency.
II. DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE IDEA AFTER 1997: DEBATING
THE SCOPE OF PRIVATE SCHOOL TUITION REIMBURSEMENT
Part I of this Note explored the United States' history of discriminating
against and ignoring the educational needs of disabled children. It
introduced the IDEA, which was enacted to prevent these harms, and
provided statistics on the increasing number of children identified as
disabled and served under the IDEA. Part I also laid out the statutory
provisions relevant to understanding the IDEA and the debate over private
school tuition reimbursement after the 1997 amendment. Part I.C explained
the legislative history of the amendment and the interpretation of the DOE.
This part takes a detailed look at this conflict. Part II.A discusses the
decisions of the federal courts of appeals holding that the 1997 amendment
is ambiguous and should not be interpreted to foreclose the remedy of
tuition reimbursement for disabled children who never previously received
special education services from a public agency. Part II.B looks at the
conflicting decisions of federal courts of appeals and the U.S. District Court
for the District of Maryland, which held that the amendment's language
clearly forecloses the remedy of tuition reimbursement for students who
never previously received special education from a public agency.
A. Courts Holding that the Provision in Question Is Ambiguous and Does
Not Supersede Equitable Remedies
A number of courts of appeals have held the provision in question to be
ambiguous and therefore have upheld the right to equitable remedies under
the IDEA. Part L.A introduces and discusses the case law in the U.S. Courts
of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits regarding tuition
reimbursement under the IDEA. Both circuits assert that the 1997
amendment to the IDEA did not foreclose the equitable considerations
authorized by the Supreme Court in Burlington or limit the remedy of
tuition reimbursement.
although an opinion letter from an administrative agency does not warrant "Chevron-style
deference," it is "'entitled to respect' (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944))).
160. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 373.
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1. The Second Circuit
a. Frank G. v. Board of Education
In Frank G. v. Board of Education,161 the Second Circuit held that the
IDEA (post-1997 revision) did not preclude tuition reimbursement for a
student who never received public special education services.162 In Frank
G., the disabled child, Anthony, was diagnosed with Attention Deficit
Hyperactive Disorder (ADHD) when he was three years old.163 Anthony,
who lived with his adoptive parents, Frank and Diane G., attended private
school from 1997 to 2001 where he initially "did Well.' 1 64 However,
Anthony's performance began to deteriorate as his school work became
more challenging and his class size increased. 165 As a result, Frank and
Diane G. notified the school district Committee on Special Education (CSE)
and had Anthony evaluated. 166  Anthony was classified as learning
disabled, and an independent neuropsychological evaluation recommended
more personalized attention and a smaller class size. 167 The evaluator also
recommended occupational therapy, "social skills training," and
counseling. 168
On August 8, 2001, the CSE proposed an IEP placing Anthony in a
public school (non-special-education) class of twenty-six to thirty
students. 169 The IEP also provided for an individual aide, special help for
"math and organizational skills," as well as "counseling, group occupational
therapy, [and] a behavior [and testing] modification program."' 70  The
parents requested an impartial hearing, stating that a class with more than
twenty-five students was not "appropriate," "a position consistent with
recommendations provided by Anthony's teachers and therapists."'171
While their request for an impartial hearing was pending, the parents
decided to place Anthony in a different private school, where he repeated
fourth grade in a class of fourteen students.172 Although the school district
eventually agreed that Anthony's IEP did not meet the requirements for a
FAPE, it argued that the school Anthony's parents placed him in was
"equally inappropriate" and therefore, it was not required to reimburse the
parents for tuition. 173 The IHO agreed that the new private school was not
161. 459 F.3d 356.
162. Id. at 372.
163. Id. at 359.
164. Id. at 359-60.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 360-61.
172. Id. at 361.
173. Id.; see also Judgment in School District's Favor Ordered in IDEA Suit over Private
School Tuition Reimbursement, N.Y. L.J., June 5, 2007, at 24 (stating that the parent bears
2756 [Vol. 77
2009] PRIVATE SCHOOL TUITION & DISABLED CHILDREN
an appropriate placement, citing Anthony's lack of "academic or social
progress."'174 Although he did not order tuition reimbursement, the IHO
ordered the school district to provide Anthony with special services,
occupational therapy, and an individual aide while he attended private
school.175 Both parties appealed. 176
After the administrative remedies were exhausted, Anthony's parents
appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York,
seeking tuition reimbursement for the year during the pendency of the
impartial hearing in which they unilaterally enrolled Anthony in the new
private school. 177 After a bench trial, Judge Charles Brieant of the Southern
District of New York held that the parents' private school placement was
appropriate based on "additional evidence of Anthony's . . . social and
behavioral development," his academic progress, and his improved
emotional state. 178 He stated that there was no reason to "disturb the IHO's
finding 'that the equities favored tuition reimbursement' if on appeal it is
found that the parent's placement is appropriate."'179 Based on the equitable
considerations authorized by the Supreme Court in Burlington,180 the
district court judge decided in favor of the parents and granted their request
for tuition reimbursement for $3660, along with attorneys' fees in the
amount of $34,567.18l
On appeal, the school district asserted two principal arguments: (1) that
the private school Anthony's parents enrolled him in was an inappropriate
placement considering his needs; and (2) even if the private school were
considered appropriate, the parents were not entitled to reimbursement
because Anthony never received "public special education and related
services." 182 The school district termed the second argument its "'absolute
defense." 83
the burden of proving both that the proposed school district placement was inappropriate and
that the unilateral private school placement is appropriate).
174. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 361. The court in Frank G. v. Board of Education stated that,
while "[g]rades, test scores, and regular advancement may constitute evidence that a child is
receiving educational benefit ... the totality of the circumstances" should be considered in
"determining whether that placement reasonably serves a child's individual needs." Id. at
364.
175. Id. at 361.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 362.
178. Id.
179. Id. Unlike in Board of Education v. Tom F., discussed infra Part II.A.1 .b, there is no
evidence that the school district asserted 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) as a defense at the
district court level. The issue was not considered until the case reached the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.
180. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
181. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 362. Judge Charles Brieant of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York "expressed concern" regarding the litigation expenses
considering the "relatively small tuition sum sought and awarded." Id.
182. Id. at 362-63.
183. Id. at 365.
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In 2006, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding and
awarded the parents retroactive tuition reimbursement. 184 In response to
the school district's first argument that Anthony's school was inappropriate,
the court stated that Anthony's private school placement "was reasonably
calculated to enable him to receive educational benefits"'185 and provided
him with "'meaningful access' to education."'186
The school district's latter argument-its "absolute defense"-was based
on the 1997 amendment to the IDEA, 187 which it claimed "established a
statutory threshold" to obtain tuition reimbursement when unilaterally
placing children in private school. 188  The school district asserted that
Anthony's parents were not entitled to tuition reimbursement because
Anthony never received special education services from a public agency,
even though his private school placement offered him a FAPE while the
proposed public school placement did not. 189
In support of this argument, the school district offered the "plain
language" of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), which explicitly states that tuition
reimbursement is available when parents of a disabled child "who
previously received special education and related services under the
authority of a public agency" unilaterally enroll their child in a private
school without consent of the agency. 190 The school district argued that
this section "implicitly exclud[ed] reimbursement" when the child has not
received special education services from a public agency. 191  As in
Anthony's case, this would foreclose reimbursement for parents who
enrolled their child in school before the child's disability, and the need for
an IEP and a FAPE, "manifested itself."192
The court in Frank G. disagreed with the school district's "absolute
defense" that under § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) a "learning disabled student [must
184. Id. at 367.
185. Id. at 366.
186. Id. at 364 (quoting Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 133
(1998)). The court conducted a detailed evaluation of Anthony's private school placement
and concluded that his small class size ("which everyone agreed was critical") and his
individualized program led to Anthony's "significant progress." Id. at 366-67. The court
debunked the claim that Anthony's progress was "'mere happenstance."' Id. at 366 (quoting
Berger v. Medina City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513, 522 n.6 (6th Cir. 2003)). As with a
proposed placement in an IEP, the parents' unilateral private school placement does not have
to be ideal to be considered appropriate. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
"[P]arents need not show that a private placement furnishes every special service necessary
to maximize their child's potential" in order to qualify for tuition reimbursement. Frank G.,
459 U.S. at 365. "They need only demonstrate that the placement provides 'educational
instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, supported by
such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from instruction."' Id. (quoting
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1982)).
187. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2006).
188. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 367.
189. Id.
190. Id.; see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).
191. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 368.
192. Id.
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be] enrolled in an inappropriate special education program offered by a
public agency [before his parents are free to] unilaterally ... enroll him at
an appropriate private school and seek reimbursement."' 93 The court held
that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) of the IDEA does not limit reimbursement to cases
where the disabled child previously received special education services
from a public agency. 194
The court stated that, "[a]s in all statutory interpretation cases," it would
begin its analysis by looking at the plain language of the statute.1 95 The
court's "first task 'is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain
and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the
case."' 196  The court found the language in § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) was
ambiguous because it did not explicitly say that tuition reimbursement was
"only" available when a child had previously received public special
education services, nor did it explicitly exclude parents whose child had not
previously received such services. 197  The fact that the school district
needed to rely on this "inference to be drawn from the plain language" of
the statute "suggests a degree of ambiguity."' 198
193. Id. at 367.
194. Id. at 367-76.
195. Id. at 368. Most cases of statutory interpretation begin with the actual text of the
statute. This approach is called the plain meaning approach. If the language used by
Congress is clear and unambiguous, a court will not look to other sources. MIKVA & LANE,
supra note 115, at 9-10 The Supreme Court has stated that "courts must presume that a
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says." Conn. Nat'l
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). The plain meaning of the text is presumed
to convey what the legislature intended, and the court's job is to enforce the statute
according to its terms. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 115, at 10. Under the plain meaning
approach, the court will often look to the statute as a whole to provide guidance and
determine context of the phrase or subject in question. Id. at 20.
196. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 368 (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450
(2002)). The court stated that it would have ended its inquiry if it found that the "language
of the statute [was] unambiguous and 'the statutory scheme [was] coherent and consistent,'
unless the case comes within the category of cases in which the result reached by applying
the plain language is sufficiently absurd to override its unambiguous terms." Id. (quoting
Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 450). Although those in favor of the plain meaning approach believe
that a statute should be interpreted primarily by looking at the text, where rigid application of
the plain meaning of a statute would lead to ridiculous or absurd results, the judge may reject
the plain meaning of the text and use another approach to interpret the statute. BROWN &
BROWN, supra note 118, at 40; see also MIKVA & LANE, supra note 115, at 10 (providing an
example of this exception to the plain meaning approach by stating "'virtually no one doubts
the correctness of the ancient decision that a statute prohibiting letting blood in the streets
did not ban emergency surgery' (quoting Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and
Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 289 (1989))).
197. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 368. The court held that it determined whether a statute was
clear or ambiguous by looking at the plain language, along with the context of the provision
and the entire statute. Id. (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)).
Using contract law as an analogy, the court stated, "we have held that '[1]anguage is
ambiguous when it is capable of more than one meaning when viewed objectively by a
reasonably intelligent person who has examined the context of the entire integrated
agreement."' Id. (quoting O'Neil v. Ret. Plan for Salaried Employees of RKO Gen., Inc., 37
F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 1994)).
198. Id. Most often, the cases that reach appellate level courts do not deal with statutes
that have a plain and clear meaning. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 115, at 19-20. If the
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Upon this finding of ambiguity, the court looked to the "'traditional
canons of statutory construction"' to resolve the issue.199 Specifically, the
court focused on the overall context and purpose of the IDEA200 along with
a related canon of statutory construction, which states that "the meaning of
an ambiguous statutory provision is 'clarified by the remainder of the
statutory scheme... [when] only one of the permissible meanings produces
a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law."'' 20 1
The court reiterated that the "express purpose of the IDEA" is to ensure
that all disabled children have access to a FAPE that is tailored to their
present and future needs. 202 One of the "primary" vehicles for providing a
FAPE under the IDEA is giving the courts "broad discretion... to grant
relief [they] deem[] appropriate. '20 3 Although the court noted that the
language added by the 1997 amendment may guide "the manner in which
the authority is exercised, '20 4 they found nothing to "suggest that Congress
sought to alter prior law in a manner that would constrain the power of a
district court judge to award reimbursement for a private placement where a
[FAPE] had not been provided [by the public agency]. '205
The court cited the Burlington holding that the IDEA should not be
interpreted to defeat the objectives of providing disabled children with a
free and appropriate education. 20 6 By holding that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)
language of the law does not provide clear direction on how to interpret a statute, courts
must use other sources to determine legislative intent. Id. at 22. See supra Part I.C for a
more detailed discussion of statutory interpretation methods.
199. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 370 (quoting United States v. Peterson, 394 F.3d 98, 105 (2d
Cir. 2005)). Canons of construction are essentially "judicially crafted maxims" or
presumptions created for interpreting statutes. Canons are intended to "limit judicial
discretion by rooting interpretive decisions in a system of aged and shared principles."
MIKVA & LANE, supra note 115, at 23-24. Although canons are frequently used by courts to
interpret statutes, they are widely criticized. Id. at 25. Scholars have stated that canons are
not a "coherent, shared body of law" that provide courts with the correct interpretation of
statutes. Id. Rather, canons are seen as "a grab bag of individual rules, from which a judge
can choose to support his or her view of the case." Id.; see also Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks
on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401 (1950) ("[T]here are two opposing canons on almost
every point."); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 806 (1983) ("You need a canon for choosing between
competing canons, and there isn't any."). Despite the widespread criticism, canons continue
to be used as "tools of interpretation." MIKVA & LANE, supra note 115, at 27.
200. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 370-71. The court cited a canon espoused by Justice Robert
H. Jackson, who observed,
[C]ourts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating
general purpose, will read text in the light of context and will interpret the text so
far as the meaning of the words fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases
the generally expressed legislative policy.
Id. at 371.
201. Id. (quoting United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 217-18
(2001)).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 371-72.
206. Id. at 372.
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does not limit the remedy of reimbursement-and that principles of equity
can still guide awards of reimbursement under § 1415(i)(2)(C)-the court
adopted what it believed to be the "only [construction] that 'produces a
substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the [IDEA]."' 20 7 The
court also reasoned that the reenactment of § 1415(i)(2)(C) without any
substantive revision was "significant" because it implied that Congress
intended to uphold the statutory interpretation of the Supreme Court in
Burlington-that the courts have "broad discretion" and "'shall grant such
relief as the court determines is appropriate.' 20 8
The final method of statutory construction considered by the court is the
rule that ambiguous statutes are to be construed as to avoid "absurd"
results. 209  The court explained that the school district's interpretation
would produce such results by proffering several hypothetical situations. 210
For example, it would prevent children whose disabilities manifest
themselves before school age from receiving a FAPE if they are given
inadequate IEPs, since they never would have received special (or any)
education services from a public agency. 211 The court also hypothesized
situations where the parents would have to "temporarily acquiesc[e] to an
inappropriate placement" (so that their child technically received services
from a public agency) in order to maintain a claim for reimbursement. 212
The Second Circuit "decline[d] to interpret [§ 1412(a)(l0)(C)(ii)] to require
parents to jeopardize their child's health and education ... in order to
qualify for the right to seek tuition reimbursement. '213
207. Id. (quoting United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 217-18
(2001)).
208. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (quoting 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C) (2006)).
209. See supra note 196.
210. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 372.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. Many advocates for disabled children agreed that foreclosing the remedy of
tuition reimbursement for students who had not previously received special education or
related services from a public agency would lead to "ominous consequences," stating that,
As a practical matter, prohibiting private tuition reimbursement unless a child
has attended public school pursuant to the school district's inadequate
individualized education plan, is potentially devastating to the disabled children.
To compel a young disabled child to begin his or her schooling in an unsuitable
program could result in more than merely a poor education: for some
developmentally disabled students, a poor placement could actually cause set-
backs in the progress their children have painstakingly accomplished. In addition,
compelling parents to have their disabled children begin the school year in public
school may hamper the parents' ability to place the child in an appropriate private
school setting, as they may not be able to keep that place available for the child if
they must send the child to public school.
Phyllis K. Saxe, Disabled Students: Private School Tuition Reimbursement, N.Y. L.J., Feb.
15, 2007, at 3 (quoting Phyllis K. Saxe & Lauren A. Foodim, Private School Tuition
Reimbursement for Disabled Students, N.Y. L.J., May 20, 2005, at 4) (internal quotations
omitted).
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b. Board of Education v. Tom F.
Frank G. was not the Second Circuit's only foray into the interpretation
of the IDEA's treatment of unilateral parent placement. Board of Education
v. Tom F.,21 4 another significant Second Circuit case, also originated in the
Southern District of New York. 215 Since kindergarten, the student in Tom
F., Gilbert, was enrolled in a private school in New York called the Stephen
Gaynor School. 216 After a CSE evaluation, Gilbert received an IEP
recommending a special education public school placement with related
services. 217 As in Frank G., 21 8 the parents disagreed with the IEP and
requested an impartial hearing and reimbursement for tuition.219 The IHO
granted the parents' request and ordered the school district to reimburse the
parents for the cost of the student's private school tuition.220 The school
district appealed, and eventually the district court reversed the holding.221
In an unpublished decision, the court held that the "clear implication of the
plain language" of § 1412(a)(10)(C) foreclosed private school tuition
reimbursement where a child had "not previously received special
education from a public agency."222
Less than two years later, the Second Circuit heard the appeal of Frank
G., holding that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) did not bar private school tuition
reimbursement for students who had never received special education
services from a public agency.223 This decision "effectively abrogated" the
district court's holding in Tom F. 2 2 4 Several days after their decision in
Frank G., the Second Circuit officially vacated and remanded Tom F. "for
further proceedings in light of [Frank G.]" 225
214. No. 01 Civ. 6845, 2005 WL 22866 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2005), vacated, 193 F. App'x
26 (2d Cir. 2006).
215. Id. This case was cast into the spotlight because the disabled child's father was Tom
Freston, the multimillionaire former CEO of Viacom and cofounder of MTV. Although
clearly able to afford his son's private school tuition, Freston said he was fighting for the
"principle of the matter" and to ensure that the government fulfilled its obligation to provide
disabled students with suitable special education programs. See Jen Chung, City Must Pay
Private Education of Disabled Students, GOTHAMIST, Oct. 11, 2007,
http://gothamist.com/2007/10/1 l/supreme court-d.php.
216. Tom F., 2005 WL 22866, at *1.
217. Id.
218. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
219. Tom F., 2005 WL 22866, at * 1.
220. Id. Freston, who left Viacom with $85 million in severance, says he has donated the
reimbursement money to tutoring programs for public schools. Stout & Medina, supra note
18.
221. TomF., 2005 WL 22866, at *3-4.
222. Id. at *3. See supra note 195 for a discussion of the plain meaning approach to
statutory interpretation.
223. See supra Part II.A. l.a.
224. See Osborne, supra note 49, at 896.
225. Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F., 193 F. App'x 26 (2d Cir. 2006), aff'd by an equally divided
court, 128 S. Ct. 1 (2007) (per curiam); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Frank G.
v. Bd. of Educ., 128 S. Ct. 436 (2007) (No. 06-580) (denying certiorari).
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The school district petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, arguing
that the Second Circuit's holding split with those of other circuits and
conflicted with the provision added to the IDEA.226 The Supreme Court
granted the petition for certiorari. 227 However, Justice Anthony Kennedy
"took no part in the decision of [the] case," and, on October 10, 2007, the
Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion affirming the Second Circuit
decision in Tom F. four to four.228 The per curiam opinion was one
sentence: "The [Second Circuit] judgment is affirmed by an equally
divided Court."'229  The following week, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in Frank G., again without the participation of Justice
Kennedy.230
Although the Supreme Court's four-four decision in Tom F. upheld the
Second Circuit's ruling, it has no precedential value in any other circuit.231
Commentators have noted that this decision-"or lack thereof'-has
created a "chasm" between the circuit court decisions and left a "dichotomy
in place on this crucial issue." 232
2. The Ninth Circuit: Forest Grove School District v. T A.
In April 2008, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of private school
tuition reimbursement for unilateral placement in Forest Grove School
District v. T. A., 233 which conformed to the Second Circuit precedent. As in
the Second Circuit cases-Frank G. and Tom F.-the court in T. A. held
that students who had never received public special education services were
still eligible for tuition reimbursement under § 1415(i)(2)(C), which
authorizes "appropriate" relief based on equitable considerations. 234
Although the Ninth Circuit reached the same holding, the underlying
facts in T. A. differed significantly from those in the Second Circuit cases.
T. A. was enrolled in public school in the Forest Grove School District from
kindergarten through the end of his junior year.235 Although he had trouble
226. See Osborne, supra note 49, at 896.
227. Bd. ofEduc. v. Tom F., 127 S. Ct. 1393 (2007) (granting certiorari).
228. Tom F., 128 S. Ct. at 1. The Court has had an even split only four times in the last
decade. See Mary Noe, Effect on Special Education Law of High Court's Decision, N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 20, 2007, at 4.
229. Tom F., 128 S. Ct. at 1.
230. Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 436.
231. See Stout & Medina, supra note 18; Posting of Mitchell H. Rubinstein to Adjunct
Law Professor Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/adjunctprofs/2007/10/equally-
divided.html (Oct. 11, 2007); see also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972) (holding
that an opinion by an equally divided Court ends the review process for the specific case, but
it does not settle the legal issue and is not "entitled to precedential weight").
232. Noe, supra note 228; see also Stout & Medina, supra note 18 (noting the
"nationwide implications" of the issue and conveying the hope of Leonard Koerner, chief of
the New York City Law Department's appeals division, that the Supreme Court would
address the issue again and resolve the circuit split).
233. 523 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 987 (2009).
234. Id. at 1080-81, 1085; see also supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
235. T. A., 523 F.3d at 1081.
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paying attention in class and completing his assignments, T. A. "passed
from grade to grade" and never received any special education services
while he was enrolled in public school. 236 T. A. was evaluated at one point
during his public school career. However, the school district determined
that he did not have a disability and his mother agreed.237
In 2002, T. A. began using drugs and "exhibited noticeable personality
changes." 238 T. A.'s parents hired a psychologist, who "diagnosed T. A.
with ADHD, depression, math disorder, and cannabis abuse." 239  The
psychologist recommended T. A. be placed in a residential program.240
After enrolling T. A. in a residential private school for "children who may
have academic, behavioral, emotional, or motivational problems," his
parents hired a lawyer and requested an evaluation and eventually a hearing
for tuition reimbursement. 241 The IHO held that T. A. was disabled and
that the school district failed to provide him with a FAPE. 242 The school
district was ordered to pay T. A.'s $5200 monthly private school tuition.243
The school district appealed, alleging that T. A. was not entitled to tuition
reimbursement under the IDEA because he never received special education
or related services at any time while he was enrolled in public school.244
Although T. A. conceded that he did not qualify for tuition reimbursement
under § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), like the parents in the Second Circuit cases, he
argued that reimbursement was still available "under general principles of
equity pursuant to [§ 1415(i)(2)(C)]." 245
The Ninth Circuit provided a detailed review of the Second Circuit's
opinion in Frank G. and stated that, "[w]e see no reason to disagree with
the Second Circuit's well-reasoned analysis of this issue." 246 The court
held that "students who have not 'previously received special education and
related services' are eligible for reimbursement, to the same extent as before
the 1997 amendments, as 'appropriate' relief pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(C).
The statutory requirements of § 1412(a)(10)(C) do not apply." 247
The school district submitted a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court on September 3, 2008.248 The Supreme Court granted the
school district's petition on January 16, 2009.249 If the Supreme Court
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1081-82. For a discussion of disabilities covered by the IDEA, see supra note
40.
240. T A., 523 F.3d at 1082.
241. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
242. Id. at 1082-83.
243. Id. at 1083.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1085.
246. Id. at 1087.
247. Id. at 1087-88 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2006)).
248. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 132.
249. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T. A., 129 S. Ct. 987 (2009) (granting certiorari); see also
Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/court-to-rule-
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affirms the decision of the Ninth Circuit, disabled children-regardless of
whether they previously received public special education-will be entitled
to tuition reimbursement when appropriate under the equitable
considerations outlined in § 1415(i)(2)(C) (and authorized by the Court in
Burlington). However, several courts have disagreed with the Second and
Ninth Circuits and held that the 1997 amendment to the IDEA precludes
tuition reimbursement for students who never received public special
education services. Part II.B discusses the decisions of these courts.
B. Courts Holding that the Plain Language of§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) Limits
the Remedy of Tuition Reimbursement
The previous section examined the legal reasoning of the Second and
Ninth Circuits in deciding that the 1997 amendment to the IDEA did not
limit the remedy of tuition reimbursement. This section introduces and
discusses the case law in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First and Third
Circuits, and the Maryland District Court. These courts reached divergent
conclusions from the Second and Ninth Circuits and held that the 1997
amendment to the IDEA does limit the remedy of private school tuition
reimbursement to cases where the disabled child previously received special
education or related services from a public agency.
1. The First Circuit: Greenland School District v. Amy N.
In Greenland School District v. Amy N., 250 the First Circuit held that the
IDEA precludes tuition reimbursement for parents of children who have not
received special education or related services from a public agency. 251
Katie, the disabled child in Amy N., attended public school from first
grade through fourth grade.252 Although Katie was a "good student," she
had "difficulty focusing" and "was easily distracted. '253 The summer after
first grade, Katie was diagnosed with ADHD by a private psychiatrist.254
Katie's second, third, and fourth grade teachers used practical techniques to
help Katie with her ADHD, such as providing her with a list of tasks to
on-state-power-over-bank-bias-5-other-cases/#more-8543 (Jan. 16, 2009, 14:08 EST).
Although Justice Anthony Kennedy recused himself "without explanation" in both the Torn
F. case and the denial of certiorari in the Frank G. case, there is no indication that Kennedy
did not participate in the decision to grant certiorari. See Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear 2
Cases Brought Against Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2009, at A15; Posting of Tony Mauro
to The Blog of Legal Times, http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/01/supreme-court-
agrees-to-decide-issue-that-caused-kennedy-recusal.htm (Jan. 16, 2009, 15:32 EST).
Although the reasons for Kennedy's recusals in 2007 have still not been disclosed,
commentators are hopeful that "whatever had caused his earlier recusal has now been
resolved, and a full court will be able to decide the issue." Posting of Tony Mauro, supra.
250. 358 F.3d 150 (lst Cir. 2004).
251. Id. at 152.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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complete and utilizing stickers as incentives for good work and behavior. 255
Katie's mother, who was a special education teacher, also spent time
helping Katie with her work.256 However, Katie never received, nor was
she evaluated for, special education services while she was in public
school.257 After fourth grade, Katie's parents enrolled her in a private
school that did not focus on special education. 258 Less than one year later,
the school requested that Katie's parents withdraw her.259 Her parents
enrolled her in a different private school with approximately thirty students,
most of whom had a learning disability or ADHD. 260 At this point, Katie's
parents asked the school district to evaluate her for special education
services. 261
Although the school district found that Katie had ADHD and an anxiety
disorder, it decided that these disabilities did not impact her performance in
school.262  It agreed to "offer Katie a plan to address some of her
organizational weaknesses," but did not propose special education
services. 263 Her parents wrote the school district a letter stating that they
disagreed with the decision to deny special education services. 264 They also
had Katie privately evaluated. 265 She was diagnosed with ADHD, and
Asperger's disorder, "a developmental disability on the autism spectrum
that is associated with significant misperceptions of otherwise routine
elements of daily life."' 266 After her parents informed the school district of
this diagnosis, the school district decided to reverse its earlier decision not
to offer Katie special education services. 267
While the school district was developing an IEP for Katie, the parents
requested an impartial due process hearing for reimbursement for Katie's
private school tuition.268  The parents challenged the district's initial
finding that Katie was not eligible for special education services as well as
the placement that was eventually proposed in Katie's IEP.269
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 153.
258. Id.
259. The reason for this request was not specified in the record. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 154.
262. Id.; see also supra note 40 and accompanying text (explaining that, even if a child is
classified as disabled, the disability must impact their educational performance in order for
them to be covered by the IDEA).
263. Amy N., 358 F.3d at 154.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 155. Rather than coding Katie as "autistic," they coded her as "other health
impaired." Id.
268. Id. Although a special education placement had not yet been proposed by the
district, the parents were concerned that the time to request a hearing would expire. Id.
269. Id. at 155-56. The IEP developed by the school district proposed providing Katie
with an individual aide, counseling, speech therapy, and "a curriculum to help Katie learn
the difference between friendly joking and hurtful teasing." Id. at 155.
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After testimony from sixteen witnesses, the IHO held that the school
district erred when it initially declined to provide Katie with an IEP. 270 In
addition, the IHO held that the IEP that was eventually developed did not
provide Katie with a FAPE and the private school placement was
appropriate. 27 1 The IHO ordered the school district to reimburse the parents
for Katie's private school tuition.272
On appeal, the district court reversed the IHO's decision to award tuition
reimbursement. The First Circuit affirmed and held that the 1997 IDEA
amendments "limit the circumstances in which parents who have
unilaterally placed their child in a private school are entitled to
reimbursement for that placement. '273 Contrary to the Second and Ninth
Circuits, the First Circuit stated that the "affirmative requirement" in §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)-that a child must have received special education and
related services from a public agency to obtain reimbursement-is not
ambiguous. 274 The court held that Katie's parents were "ineligible" for
reimbursement because they did not meet the "threshold requirement[]" that
Katie receive special education services while in the public school
system.275
The court also found that "additional limitations on reimbursement,"
such as the requirement that parents give the school district notice of their
intent to remove their child from public school, "reinforce [the court's]
conclusion" to deny tuition reimbursement. 276 This notice requirement
"serves the important purpose of giving the school system an opportunity
[to] ... devise an appropriate plan, and determine whether a [FAPE] can be
provided in the public schools. '277
In denying tuition reimbursement to Katie's parents, the court stated that
it was upholding "[o]ne specific purpose of the amendments," which
was "to control government expenditures for students voluntarily placed in
private schools by their parents." 278  The holding also "reinforced the
principle that children should not be removed unnecessarily from regular
education environments." 279
2. The Third Circuit: Marissa F. v. William Penn School District
The First Circuit is not alone in finding the 1997 amendment limited the
availability of tuition reimbursement. The Third Circuit has also
270. Id. at 155-56.
271. Id. at 156.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 157 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) (2006)).
274. Id. at 159.
275. Id. at 159-60.
276. Id. at 160. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
IDEA's notice requirement.
277. Amy N., 358 F.3d at 160.
278. Id. at 152.
279. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2006)); see also supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
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commented on this issue in an unpublished opinion. In Marissa F. v.
William Penn School District,280 Marissa, the disabled child, attended
private school from 1996 to 2002.281 Although there had been some
communication with the school district regarding Marissa's disability, she
was never formally evaluated and was never enrolled nor provided with
special education services at a district school. 282 However, from 1996 to
2001, the school district reimbursed Marissa's parents for transportation
expenses to her private school.283  In 2001, Marissa transferred to a
different private school over ten miles outside of the district, and the school
district ceased paying for her transportation. 284
In 2002, Marissa's parents requested a due process hearing because the
school district was denying them transportation benefits. 285 They added a
claim for tuition reimbursement and consented to the development of an
IEP for Marissa.286 The Third Circuit did not discuss the details of
Marissa's IEP in the opinion. However, it upheld the school district's
proposed public school services. 287  Although it did not specifically
mention § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) of the IDEA, the court noted that tuition
reimbursement was barred because the district had never been given the
opportunity to provide special education services. 288
3. The District of Maryland Weighs In
In 2005, the District of Maryland held, "[t]he plain language of section
1412(a)(l[0])(C)(ii) makes it clear that, as a threshold matter,
reimbursement is available only in cases where the disabled student was at
one time receiving 'special education and related services' from a public
agency." 289 Isobel, the disabled child in this case, had attended private
school since kindergarten. 290 In 2003, when Isobel was around eleven
years old, her parents moved her to a different private school and contacted
the public school district to request that Isobel be evaluated. 291 The school
district initially "misplaced the letter" sent by the parents requesting an
280. 199 F. App'x 151 (3d. Cir. 2006). This opinion does not have precedential value
because it is unpublished.
281. Id. at 152-53.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 153.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 153-54.
288. Id. at 153; see also Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. Deflaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 276 n.21
(3d Cir. 2007) (noting, in dicta, that the plain language of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) may limit
tuition reimbursement to parents with children who never previously received special
education services under IDEA).
289. Bait. City Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs v. Taylorch, 395 F. Supp. 2d 246, 249 (D. Md.
2005) (quoting Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist. v. V. P., 373 F. Supp. 2d 402, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
290. Id. at 247.
291. Id.
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evaluation. 292 When the letter was found, the school district contacted the
parents to schedule an initial IEP meeting.293 After the letter was found, the
parents briefly withdrew their request for a due process hearing. 294
However, after the school district attempted to schedule an IEP meeting, the
parents "refused to participate" and refiled their request for an impartial
hearing. 295 The parents asserted that the school district-by misplacing and
not initially responding to the parent's letter-failed to develop an adequate
IEP for Isobel and, therefore, denied her a FAPE. 2
96
The IHO initially found that Isobel's parents were entitled to tuition
reimbursement for the period after they sent the letter asking the school
district to evaluate Isobel.29 7 The Maryland District Court agreed that
misplacing the parent's letter resulted in a procedural violation of the IDEA
and the denial of a FAPE. 298 However, the court overturned the IHO's
ruling based on § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) of the IDEA.299 After finding that the
plain language of the provision was unambiguous and "limit[ed] the
circumstances in which reimbursement is available to parents," the court
stated that "the statutory text commands (and permits) only one result: her
parents are not eligible for tuition reimbursement under the IDEA." 300
The district court quoted the First Circuit in Amy N, 30' stating that one of
the purposes of the 1997 amendment was to narrow the remedy of tuition
reimbursement and "'to control government expenditures for students
voluntarily placed in private schools by their parents."' 30 2
The interpretation of the First and Third Circuits and the District of
Maryland is at odds with that of the Second and Ninth Circuits. Because
these divergent views would have vastly different consequences for the
availability of tuition reimbursement, families of children with disabilities,
advocates, and school districts are in need of guidance and a resolution to
this circuit split. Part III proposes that the Supreme Court affirm the Ninth
Circuit's decision in T. A. and defer to the interpretation of the DOE.
III. UPHOLDING THE VISION OF THE IDEA: COURTS SHOULD CONTINUE
TO AWARD TUITION REIMBURSEMENT TO DISABLED CHILDREN WHO
NEVER RECEIVED PUBLIC SPECIAL EDUCATION BASED ON THE EQUITABLE
REMEDY AUTHORIZED BY THE IDEA
After the Supreme Court's false start in Tom F., the confusion and
controversy over the availability of private school tuition reimbursement
292. Id.
293. Id. at 247-48.
294. Id. at 248.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 248-49.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 249.
300. Id.
301. Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 152 (lst Cir. 2004).
302. Taylorch, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 249 (quoting Amy N., 358 F.3d at 152).
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has only grown. Given the significant implications for both children with
disabilities and school districts, this Note advocates that the Supreme Court
clearly resolve this issue when it hears T. A. later this Term.
Part I of this Note provided background information on the IDEA,
explained the equitable remedy of tuition reimbursement recognized by the
Supreme Court in Burlington, and described the 1997 amendment to the
IDEA. It also examined the relevant legislative history of the IDEA and the
DOE's interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) in both an official regulation
and an informal policy letter. Part II explored the controversy and
conflicting litigation over whether the 1997 amendment to the IDEA-
specifically, the addition of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) 3 3-constituted a bar on
the remedy of tuition reimbursement, except in cases where the disabled
child had "previously received special education and related services under
the authority of a public agency. '304  The Second and Ninth Circuits-
which held that the equitable remedy of tuition reimbursement for all
disabled children unilaterally placed in private school survived the 1997
amendment 305-reached divergent conclusions from the First and Third
Circuits and the Maryland District Court-which held that the 1997
amendment eliminated the remedy of tuition reimbursement for children
who had never previously received special education in a public school.306
The circuit courts split over the impact of the 1997 amendment on tuition
reimbursement in part because they disagreed on whether the wording of §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) was ambiguous.
Part III of this Note argues that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) of the IDEA is
ambiguous and should not be interpreted based on the "plain language" of
the provision. 30 7 Rather, Part III proposes that Congress did not intend §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) to bar tuition reimbursement for students who have not
previously received public special education services. Finally, Part III
advocates that the Supreme Court affirm the Ninth Circuit decision in
T. A. 30 8 The reading of the Ninth (and Second) Circuit is consistent with
the remainder of the IDEA (specifically § 1415(i)(2)(C)), 309 the explicitly
303. For a discussion of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), see supra notes 107-09 and accompanying
text.
304. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2006).
305. See supra Part II.A.
306. See supra Part II.B.
307. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
308. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T. A., 523 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S.
Ct. 987 (2009).
309. See supra notes 91-93 (discussing the Supreme Court's holding in Burlington that
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C) authorizes the court to grant tuition reimbursement based on
"principles of equity" when appropriate). This section of the IDEA was substantively
unchanged by the 1997 revision to the IDEA, suggesting "that Congress intended to adopt
the construction given to it by the Supreme Court [in Burlington] and made that construction
part of the enactment." Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 369-70 (2d Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 436 (2007) (citing Shapira v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16 (1948);
Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 500 (1933)).
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stated purpose of the IDEA, 310 and the DOE's official regulation which
comments on the issue. 311
A. Legislative Intent Cannot Be Discerned from the Ambiguous Language
of§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)
The 1997 amendment to the IDEA is ambiguous, and Congress's intent
cannot be discerned from the text of the statute alone. Even under a plain
meaning approach to statutory interpretation,312  the text of §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) should be viewed as ambiguous when considered in
conjunction with the rest of the IDEA. 313
Although § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does say that the remedy of tuition
reimbursement is available to students who have previously received public
special education and related services, 314 it does not explicitly state (or even
imply) that this provision is intended to foreclose the remedy of tuition
reimbursement for other disabled children. 315  The conclusion that §
1412(a)(l0(C)(ii) was intended as a statutory bar to private school tuition
reimbursement requires "an inference to be drawn from the plain language
[of the provision], rather than the language itself."' 316 The Second Circuit's
conclusion that this suggests "a degree of ambiguity" 317 is compelling,
especially in light of the context of the provision and stated purpose of the
IDEA.
Considering the "Child Find" provision of the IDEA,318 along with §
1415(i)(2)(C), 319 it is unlikely that the 1997 revision to the IDEA was
intended to limit the remedy of tuition reimbursement to children who
previously received special education services from a public agency.
Although the Child Find provision of the IDEA does not address private
school tuition reimbursement-or remedies authorized by the IDEA at all-
it is relevant in determining Congress's intent in amending the IDEA in
1997. This provision, which requires states to identify disabled children in
public as well as private schools and to determine whether they need special
310. See supra notes 39, 98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the express
purpose of the IDEA.
311. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the DOE's
official regulation on the remedy of tuition reimbursement under the IDEA.
312. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the plain
meaning approach to statutory interpretation.
313. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 368; see also supra note 197 and accompanying text
(discussing that whether a statute is clear or ambiguous should be determined by looking at
the language and the context of the provision and the statute as a whole).
314. See supra notes 107-08.
315. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit's
holding in Frank G. that the provision was ambiguous because it did not say that tuition
reimbursement was only available when a child has previously received public services).
316. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 368.
317. Id.
318. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
2771
FORDHAM LA W RE VIEW
education, 320 is not consistent with the reading of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)
proposed by the First and Third Circuits and the Maryland District Court. 321
It is hard to imagine that Congress would place an affirmative obligation on
the states to seek out disabled children in private schools, while intending to
deny these children a remedy if it turns out that the public school cannot
provide them with a FAPE due to the extent of their disability. 322
Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) should be read in context with the Child Find
provision, as well as § 1415(i)(2)(C), which states that a court "shall grant
such relief as [it] determines is appropriate. '323 Although the reenactment
of § 1415(i)(2)(C) (in 1997 and 2004) without change is not determinative
of congressional intent, it is significant in that it creates "a question to
which the IDEA does not provide an unambiguous answer. '324
B. Protecting "All Children with Disabilities ": The Expressly Stated
Purpose of the IDEA Does Not Comport with Limiting the Remedy of
Tuition Reimbursement
The previous section asserted that the language of the 1997 amendment
to the IDEA is ambiguous and that the intent of Congress cannot be
discerned from the text alone. This section reviews the purpose of the
IDEA and argues that limiting the remedy of tuition reimbursement is not
consistent with this expressly stated purpose. Finally, this section asserts
that it is necessary to look at extrinsic sources to interpret the 1997
amendment to the IDEA.
The IDEA expressly states a goal of making a FAPE available to "all
children with disabilities." 325 In Burlington, the Supreme Court held that
the IDEA should not be interpreted in a way that would undermine the
objectives of providing a disabled child with both a free and an appropriate
education.326  Although Burlington dealt with retroactive tuition
reimbursement under the IDEA as a whole-and not just for children who
have not previously received special education services from a public
school-the rationale behind the Court's interpretation of § 1415 still
320. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
321. See supra Part II.B.
322. It is important to note that, under any reading of the IDEA, a claim for private school
tuition reimbursement is predicated on a finding that the school district cannot provide the
disabled student with a FAPE. See supra note 94; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i)
(2006) (asserting that the state does not have to pay for the cost of private school education if
a FAPE was made available to the child in a public school and the parents elected to place
the child in private school anyway).
323. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C); see also supra note 91 and accompanying text.
324. Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 369-71 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied 128 S.
Ct. 436 (2007) (stating that the reenactment of § 1415 without change signals that Congress
agreed with the Supreme Court's holding in Burlington to the extent that equitable
considerations are relevant in determining relief). This provision was also reenacted without
change in 2004. See Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004) (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)).
325. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
326. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 372 (1985).
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applies. The Court in Burlington stated that "Congress undoubtedly did not
intend" to limit the remedy of retroactive tuition reimbursement to children
who are unilaterally placed in private school, leaving those children "less
than complete[ly]" protected under the IDEA.32 7 The 1997 amendment to
the IDEA should be interpreted under this same framework. 328
The plain meaning of § 1412(a)(10)(c)(ii), considered in light of the
statutory language, the context of the provision, and the purpose of the
IDEA, is ambiguous, 329 and the intent of Congress cannot be discerned
without looking at extrinsic sources, such as administrative agency
interpretation. 330  The next section will review the test established in
Chevron for deferring to administrative agency's interpretations, discuss the
DOE's interpretation, and, finally, suggest that the Supreme Court defer to
the DOE's interpretation of the 1997 amendment to the IDEA.
C. The DOE's Interpretation Is Reasonable and Should Be Afforded
Deference
As previously discussed, Congress's intent in amending the IDEA in
1997 cannot be discerned from the ambiguous language of the provision in
question. This section urges deference to the statutory interpretation of the
DOE, the federal administrative agency responsible for administering the
IDEA,331 which has explicitly commented on the remedy of tuition
reimbursement after the 1997 amendment. 332
Under the two-step analysis the Supreme Court proffered in Chevron,333
the DOE's interpretation of the IDEA should be accorded deference if (1)
intent of the legislature cannot be determined from the plain language of the
statute; 334 and (2) if the interpretation given by the agency is reasonable. 335
The DOE stated its position both in a final official regulation (in response to
a request for clarification during the notice-and-comment rulemaking
period)336 and in an informal policy letter by the Director of the DOE
Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services. 337
Courts should give the DOE's interpretation deference because the plain
language of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is ambiguous, does not convey a clear
327. Id. at 370.
328. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 369-70.
329. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text. The DOE's interpretation of §
1412(a)(10)(c)(ii) "explicitly rejected the Board's arguments that (1) enrollment in a public
school special education program is a prerequisite for seeking private school tuition
reimbursement; and (2) subsection (C)(ii) restricts or limits a court's equitable powers under
§ 1415." Brief for Respondent, supra note 133, at 25.
333. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
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legislative intent, and the official regulation-which was promulgated
under the power delegated to the DOE by Congress338-was a reasonable
interpretation of the statute.339
The Supreme Court should resolve the controversy over private school
tuition reimbursement 340 when it decides the Ninth Circuit case of T A.
later this Term. 341  The Court should give deference to the DOE's
regulation, which explicitly states that the equitable remedy of tuition
reimbursement was not eliminated by the 1997 amendment. This finding is
consistent with the IDEA's primary purpose of providing a free and
appropriate education to all disabled children-whether or not they
previously received special education services from a public agency.
D. Concerns over the Financial Implications of Tuition Reimbursement
and Abuse by Parents Do Not Require a Different Interpretation of the
Provision
The previous section suggested that the Supreme Court defer to the
DOE's interpretation of the IDEA when it reviews the Ninth Circuit's
decision in T A. This section addresses and refutes the claim that the
legislature intended to limit the remedy of tuition reimbursement in order to
control costs and prevent parents from abusing the remedies authorized by
the IDEA. Although these issues are significant and are relevant to the
interpretation of the statute, neither justification supports a finding that
Congress intended § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) to limit the remedy of tuition
reimbursement available under the IDEA.
1. Concerns over Financial Implications Are Not Compelling
The legislative history indicates that controlling costs was one of
Congress's priorities in amending the IDEA in 1997.342 However, the
history never explicitly states that the remedy of tuition reimbursement
should be limited as a method of controlling these costs. Most of the
legislative history discussing IDEA expenditures is not related to the
provision in question or the issue of retroactive private school tuition
reimbursement at all. 343
338. See U.S. Department of Education, supra note 135 (explaining that, when Congress
created the DOE, a cabinet-level agency, it delegated the power to "implement[] laws
enacted by Congress").
339. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
340. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's 4-4 split in Tom F., see supra notes 226-32
and accompanying text. The circuit split over the issue of tuition reimbursement for disabled
children who never received special education or related services from a public agency was
not resolved by the Court's one-sentence per curiam opinion in Tom F., which is not
precedent outside of the Second Circuit.
341. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T. A., 523 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted,
129 S. Ct. 987 (2009); see also Posting of Lyle Denniston, supra note 249; supra notes 233-
49 (discussing T A.).
342. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
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The goal of controlling government expenditures for special education
services-although an important issue that should be addressed-does not
support a holding that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) bars tuition reimbursement for
all children who never received public special education services. The
vague and nonspecific legislative history regarding financial
expenditures 344 does not overcome the explicitly stated purpose of the
IDEA: that all children with disabilities be provided with a FAPE.345
Further, the issue of cost control can be addressed without barring tuition
reimbursement for children who never received special education services
in public school. The equitable remedy authorized by § 1415(i)(2)(C) does
not mandate tuition reimbursement for all students unilaterally placed in
private school, even when the public agency cannot provide a FAPE.
Rather, it directs IHOs and courts to grant relief they determine
"appropriate." 346
By maintaining this discretion and flexibility, courts can consider the
appropriate educational placement for each individual child, as well as the
issues impacting school districts (such as inadequate funding) when
determining if a specific private school placement and/or tuition
reimbursement is "appropriate" relief under the IDEA. How significantly
the cost of a special education program should be considered in a court's
decision-and if it should even be considered at all-has been widely
debated. 347 However, most circuits agree that cost cannot be completely
ignored when determining whether a placement or reimbursement is
appropriate. 348
2. Safeguards in the IDEA Are Adequate to Protect Against Abuse
Although the fear that some parents might attempt to abuse the system is
not completely unwarranted, there are safeguards currently in the IDEA to
protect against this. In Tom F., the school district expressed concern that, if
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) were interpreted to allow tuition reimbursement for
students who had not received public school special education services,
parents would be given an incentive to "seek an IEP and later challenge its
344. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
347. See Oliver, supra note 66, at 779; Willard, supra note 45, at 1177-78.
348. See Oliver, supra note 66, at 787 (proposing a "reasonableness standard" for cost
consideration, that would allow courts to "use tailored judgment for each individual child"
and balance the academic benefits of a placement against practical considerations, such as
cost). Although Ashley Oliver discusses the cost of a proposed private school placement,
rather than the cost of tuition reimbursement for a parent's unilateral placement, "there is a
significant amount of overlap" between the issues. Id. at 789. The broad discretion given by
the IDEA should allow the courts to consider practical factors, such as prohibitive costs,
when determining whether a placement-and as a result tuition reimbursement for that
placement-is reasonable.
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adequacy, even though they [had] no intention of placing their child in
public school." 349
The current "statutory construct [of the IDEA] is a significant deterrent"
to these types of abusive and dishonest claims.350 As stated by the Supreme
Court in Burlington (and explicitly noted in the IDEA), parents who
unilaterally place their children in private school do so at their own peril
and "financial risk."'351 Further, the parents have the burden of proving the
requirements for relief.352 This distribution of risks and burdens of proof-
along with the fact that IDEA claims often take several months or years353
and can be extremely expensive-make it unlikely that the parent of a
disabled child will enter into this process unless they truly believe that the
school district cannot provide their child with a FAPE.
Even if a parent does make an IDEA claim in bad faith, §
1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) explicitly states that tuition reimbursement can be
reduced or denied based on a finding of any "unreasonableness with respect
to actions taken by the parents." 354 This provision, along with the equitable
considerations authorized by § 1415(i)(2)(C) and upheld by the Court in
Burlington,355 allows IHOs and courts to scrutinize closely parents'
behavior when determining whether to award tuition reimbursement in each
individual case.
Upholding the equitable remedy authorized in Burlington-even when a
child has not previously received special education services from a public
agency-will give courts the power to consider all of the circumstances
when fashioning relief and to reject claims from parents who act in bad
faith. Thus, the Supreme Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit's decision
in T. A. and defer to the interpretation of the DOE, giving children with
disabilities, parents, and school districts closure and guidance on this issue.
CONCLUSION
This Note explored the conflict over whether private school tuition
reimbursement should be available under the IDEA for disabled children
who are unilaterally placed in private school by their parents without
previously receiving special education or related services from a public
agency. In 1997, Congress amended the IDEA and added an ambiguous
provision regarding the availability of tuition reimbursement for students
349. Brief for Respondent, supra note 133, at 41 (reviewing and rebutting the school
district's concerns regarding parental abuses). The school district claimed that the parents in
Tom F. had "predetermined that he was going to reject the public placement by the time it
was offered," even if it could provide his son with a FAPE. Brief for Petitioner, supra note
130, at 36.
350. Brief for Respondent, supra note 133, at 41.
351. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 373-74 (1985); see also
supra notes 94, 111 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 17, 96 and accompanying text.
354. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) (2006).
355. See id. § 1415(i)(2)(C); Burlington, 471 U.S. at 372.
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unilaterally enrolled in private school. Several of the U.S. courts of appeals
have reached divergent conclusions on the issue. In 2007, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split, but the Justices split
four-four and issued a one-sentence opinion, offering no guidance on
whether the remedy of tuition reimbursement was limited by the 1997
amendments to the IDEA.
This Note is hopeful that the Supreme Court will resolve the split and
provide guidance to both parents of disabled children and school districts by
affirming the Ninth Circuit's decision in T A. later this Term. This Note
advocates that the Supreme Court defer to the interpretation of the DOE and
hold that the 1997 amendment to the IDEA does not foreclose the remedy
of tuition reimbursement for children who never previously received special
education or related services from a public agency. This interpretation is
consistent with prior precedent and the primary purpose of the IDEA: "to
ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free
appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related
services designed to meet their unique needs." 356
356. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
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